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INTRODUCTION
As courts continue to increase tort liability by, in Professor Henderson's words,
expanding and purifying the negligence concept,' another common law limit on
liability being swept away is the fireman's rule. This rule bars firefighters, police
officers, ambulance drivers, emergency medical technicians, and other professional
rescuers from maintaining a tort suit against the private party, typically a crime victim
or an occupant of a home or business, whose negligence triggered the peril in response
to which the professional rescuer was injured.2 An example of negligence that does not
* Professor of Law, B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, J.D., University of
Wisconsin Law School.
1. James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 491 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Whiting v. Cent. Trux & Parts, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1096, 1106 (E.D. Mich.
1997) (U.S. customs inspector); Moody v. Delta W., Inc., 38 P.3d 1139, 1142 (Alaska 2002)
(police officer); Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 694 P.2d 433,438 (Kan. 1985) (firefighter);
Pinter v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 613 N.W.2d 110, 119 (Wis. 2000) (EMT). But see, e.g.,
Lees v. Lobosco, 625 A.2d 573, 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (rule not extended to
EMTs). In contrast, ordinary persons who are injured in an attempt to rescue others endangered
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lead to liability thanks to the fireman's rule would be a homeowner's or restauranteur's
negligent failure to turn off a stove, thereby starting a fire that leads to a responding
firefighter being injured. Other examples include a business owner's negligent failure
to secure the doors overnight, thereby enabling a robbery, or a crime victim's negligent
provocation of a criminal assault against himself, both of which lead to a responding
police officer being injured.
In the modem era, courts or legislatures in at least eight jurisdictions have rejected
the fireman's rule. 3 Hence, once the professional rescuer in these jurisdictions shows
that the defendant crime victim or home or business owner was negligent in triggering
the peril and that the rescuer's injuries came from responding to the peril, the rescuer
will establish a prima facie case against the defendant. At that point the defendant must
resort to her only substantive defense, the rescuer's contributory negligence, which,
this Article argues, the defendant will face severe difficulties establishing. Because the
rescuer's tort recovery is likely to be reduced only slightly by the subrogation claims of
those who provided first-party benefits to the rescuer-such as his accident, life, and
health insurers, the administrators of his disability pension plan, or those paying for
specially created death benefits4 -that recovery may come on top of all the first-party
benefits he also received. 5 As more than half of police and fire perils can be attributed
by the negligence of a defendant often recover. See, e.g., Wagner v. Int'l Ry., 133 N.E. 437,437
(N.Y. 1921). ("Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief.").
3. For cases abolishing or limiting the rule, see, for example, Trousdell v. Cannon, 572
S.E.2d 264, 266 (S.C. 2002); Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Or. 1984); Wills v.
Bath Excavating & Constr. Co., 829 P.2d 405, 409 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Mull v. Kerstetter,
540 A.2d 951,954 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). For legislation abolishing or limiting the rule, see, for
example, FLA. STAT. § 112.182 (West 2002), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2965 (West 2000);
MINN. STAT. § 604.06 (West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-21 (West 2000); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 11-106 (McKinney 2001).
4. Courts have refused to imply a subrogation right either for life insurers to wrongful
death awards or for accident insurers to personal injury awards. Nor does the federal
government obtain subrogation rights after paying social security disability benefits. See ROBERT
E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 3.10(6), at 227 (1988). Providers of workers'
compensation benefits and their equivalents, in contrast, will possess a subrogation right to the
rescuer's tort recovery. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §
B 19 cmt. 1 (2000). But in many jurisdictions that subrogation right cannot be pursued unless the
injured insured has been "made whole" by the tort recovery. Those possessing subrogation
rights often encounter prohibitive difficulty establishing that prerequisite in personal injury
cases, especially cases that settle. See, e.g., Ives v. Coopertools, 559 N.W.2d 571,575-83 (Wis.
1997) (illustrating the difficulty). Thus far subrogation claims, in practice, have reduced the tort
recoveries (including settlements) of professional rescuers only slightly. See, e.g., Dianne
Williamson, Obscure Rule Lets Police Double Dip: 'Rescue Doctrine'Pays a Second Time for
Injury, SUNDAY TELEGRAM (MASS.), Nov. 29, 1998, at B I (noting all subrogation claims
reduced a policeman's tort recovery of $155,000 by only $16,000).
5. On November 30,2003, President Bush signed into law the Federal Hometown Heroes
Survivors Benefit Act, Pub. L. No. 108-182, 117 Stat. 2649 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
3796(k) (Supp. III 2003)), which extended the federal benefits provided by the Public Safety
Officers' Death Benefits Program (PSOB) to all public safety officers or other first responders
throughout the country who die or are permanently disabled while on duty. Id. The PSOB
benefit is to be paid in a lump sum after application and is set at $295,194 (in 2006 dollars to be
increased with inflation.) See 42 U.S.C. § 3796(a), (h) (2006); U.S. Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Assistance, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/psob/psob-main.html (last
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to the negligence of some potential defendants,6 many of whom will possess liability
insurance covering the rescuer's tort judgment,7 abolishing the fireman's rule will
invite many new lawsuits. Defendants, even if they possess some liability insurance
coverage, will face these suits, with their accompanying annoyance and financial and
reputational costs, at a time of particular vulnerability-when they are trying to cope
with their own losses from the same peril that injured the professional rescuer.8
After explaining the fireman's rule in Part I, this Article discusses in Part II most of
the arguments for and against the rule. Abolishing the rule, for example, will create
more incentive for potential defendants to take precautions against these perils, and, to
the extent that the rescuer's first-party-benefit providers enforce their subrogation
rights to the tort recovery, may decrease the cost to the public of the rescuer's first-
party benefits. But abolishing the rule would also give professional rescuers
considerable discretion to select which crime victims or home or business owners to
sue, thus raising the specter of invidious discrimination by these public servants.
Abolishing the rule also threatens to render the public cynical about rescuers and their
motivation as the proud motto, "to protect and serve," becomes in the public eye, "to
protect and sue." Abolishing the rule, by injecting into the squad room the lottery-like
prospect of tort recovery, may undermine the morale and team spirit of professional
rescuers and impair their perception of their work and their relationship with the
public. Abolishing the rule will also raise doubts about the integrity of police and fire
investigations into these perils. Finally, abolishing the rule will inflict the scrutiny and
grief of tort litigation on another group of potential defendants and on another area of
human endeavor.
visited Apr. 2, 2007). The PSOB award is not reduced by any state or local benefits, even
though substantial state and local benefits, especially for death or permanent disability, are
invariably provided. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796(f). Nor will the federal government possess a
subrogation right to the rescuer's personal injury award or the heirs' wrongful death award.
The PSOB and other first-party benefits, which the federal, state, and local governments
provide professional rescuers, render irrelevant a major argument against reliance on first-party
benefits in lieu of tort liability. That argument maintains that the adverse selection and moral
hazard problems that plague a key first-party benefit, disability insurance, assure that first-party
benefits will always undercompensate the injured plaintiff. Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and
the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 362 (1990) (criticizing
George Priest's reliance on first-party benefits because he "fails to address the adverse selection
and moral hazard problems that inevitably depress the... market for disability insurance"). See
infra Part III.E.2.
6. The United States Fire Association estimates that 77% of the calls for firefighters could
be said to arise from negligence on the part of residents or owners of the building to which the
firefighters are summoned. UNITED STATES FIRE AssocIATION, FIRE IN THE UNITED STATES:
1992-2001, at 29, available at http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fiusl 3/
ch2.pdf; see also Furstein v. Hill, 590 A.2d 939,944 (Conn. 1991) (noting a high percentage of
police perils caused by negligence); Winn v. Frasher, 777 P.2d 722, 725 (Idaho 1989) (same).
7. The liability insurance portion of the standard homeowner's policy will cover the
homeowner's liability to professional rescuers. Likewise, a business's liability to rescuers will
be covered by the standard business owner's policy (BOP), which sometimes includes both a
"premises and operations in progress policy" and a "completed operations policy." See Dash
Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 582 N.E.2d 1257 (1991).
8. Rescue Work Is Risky, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 13, 1999, at A12. Referring to one
professional rescuer's tort recovery, the editors concluded "Imposing such a burden [of tort
liability] on someone calling for help, usually in panic, is unreasonable." Id.
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Part III presents the further arguments that arise from virtually every injured9
professional rescuer receiving a package of first-party benefits that achieve, at least in
large part, society's compensation goals.1° Throughout the country, these first-party
benefits are substantially more generous than those provided workers covered only by
workers' compensation. Moreover, these packages of benefits can be budgeted based
on reasonably accurate predictions of the chance and severity of the rescuer's injury.
Part III therefore discusses the arguments for the fireman's rule that arise from a
professional rescuer being what might be called a "premium planner" for his on-the-job
injuries compared to most tort plaintiffs. Premium planners can be distinguished from
other potential tort plaintiffs on the following criteria. First, premium planners, or their
union or employer representatives, are better able to measure beforehand the risk of the
injury and to insure against it through first-party methods. There are at least four
reasons this may be the case: (1) the risk of this type of on-the-job injury is of
sufficient magnitude to warrant prior planning, (2) these on-the-job injuries occur at a
predictable rate, (3) the activity of the premium planners that subjects them to the risk
of injury is sufficiently organized so that insurance coverage can be structured to it,
and (4) these potential tort plaintiffs are sufficiently numerous and organized to plan
for injury as a group. Second, premium planners or their representatives are not only
better able than most plaintiffs to arrange first-party compensation for the types of
injuries in question, they can also provide this compensation more accurately,
promptly, and cheaply than the defendants can compensate them through the
defendants' liability insurance. This is not merely because of the usual, and striking,
administrative cost advantages of first-party benefits over tort liability. 1 This may also
9. When this Article speaks of "rescuers", it henceforth refers to professional rescuers,
unless otherwise indicated. When it speaks of "injured" rescuers, it refers both to those Who are
injured, and hence sue in their own name, and to those who die and whose heirs bring a
wrongful death suit. The Article also assumes that all rescuers are public employees.
10. Compensation goals include income security and payment of medical and rehabilitative
services. Admittedly, the first-party benefits do not expressly compensate for pain and suffering,
and, hence, total less than would a tort judgment.
11. The administrative costs of liability consist primarily of the fees of the plaintiffs' and
the defendants' attorneys, the fees for expert witnesses and for transcriptions of testimony, and
the other administrative costs of the liability insurer. Total administrative costs include not just
the costs of trials but also the costs of settlement. Ignoring the costs imposed on the court system
by these suits, which the taxpayer must bear, a consensus exists that administrative costs account
for at least 58% of all liability insurance costs. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS:
2002 UPDATE iii (2003); see also DEBORAH R. HENSLER, MARY E. VAIANA, JAMES S. KAKALIK &
MARK A. PETERSON, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 25-29
(1987); JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION iii (1986); PATRICIA MUNCH, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE TORT SYSTEM IF VIEWED
AS A COMPENSATION SYSTEM ix (1977). This stunning overhead suggests the great extent to
which tort liability must achieve deterrence and other goals in order for the social benefits of
that liability to exceed the social costs. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 225-
26 (1985) (estimating how much malpractice each malpractice award must deter for the
deterrence benefits of liability to outweigh the administrative costs of liability).
The administrative costs associated with the provision of first-party benefits, in contrast, are
sharply lower. The replacement of tort liability against employers with workers' compensation,
where administrative costs, according to the Tillinghast study, consume at most 21% of total
costs, illustrates some of the reasons for these savings. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, TORT
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be because premium planners, their representatives, or their first-party-benefit
providers possess better ability to estimate these risks and more reason to focus upon
them than do defendants or defendants' liability insurers. Third, premium planners
have actually arranged significant first-party benefits commensurate with these risks,
thereby guaranteeing that no unforeseen obstacles prevent such planning.
The Article seeks to draw parallels between professional rescuers and other
plaintiffs who are likely to be premium planners for their injuries. Other premium
planners include professional racecar drivers injured by the negligent maintenance of a
racetrack, homeowners whose property is damaged by a city-wide fire negligently
started by another, and healthcare workers at mental institutions and facilities for
Alzheimer's patients who are injured by the negligence of the patients. The suits of
such plaintiffs, this Article contends, receive less generous treatment from modem
courts than do suits of other plaintiffs. The rationales given for this less generous
treatment vary, although they rarely, if ever, include the rationale suggested here-that
plaintiff is a premium planner for his injuries. For instance, the injured professional
racecar driver is more likely than other plaintiffs to find that the court will enforce his
exculpatory agreement with the racetrack.12 The homeowner is more likely to find that
the court will excuse the negligent defendant who ignited the city-wide fire on the
ground of "no duty" or "no proximate cause."' 13 The healthcare worker is offered a
number of explanations for why his tort suit against the patient fails.'
4
CosT TRENDS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 16 (1989). See also ALl, ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, 119 (15-20% of total claim costs are spent on
administration under workers' compensation compared to 50-55% for tort liability). The
assessment of first-party benefits does not require inquiry into the defendant's behavior, and the
inquiry into the insured's behavior and the cause of the insured's injury is severely truncated.
Those assessing first-party benefits have often adopted comparatively simple procedures for
verifying the severity of their insured's injury. They will also have available, as a byproduct of
planning the benefits, better information about the pre-injury condition of their insured and even
about the insured's tendency to claim injury, thus reducing the threat of overclaiming.
Assessment of first-party benefits does not require resolving widely divergent and highly
uncertain claims for pain and suffering or loss of consortium. While individual valuation of all
damages is the norm in tort, first-party benefits providers can often take advantage of much
cheaper collective valuation through damage schedules. Early compromise between benefit
providers and the insured is facilitated through awareness of comparable compensation accorded
the insured's colleagues who have been injured in the past. Moreover, the previous and usually
ongoing relationship between the benefit provider, the employer, and the injured employee is
typically less adversarial than that between the parties in a tort case where the plaintiff is likely a
stranger to the defendant and to the defendant's liability insurer. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 263 n.2 (1987) [hereinafter SHAVELL, ACCIDENT LAW]. For all
these reasons, the involvement of attorneys and the expense of experts and transcribers are
dramatically less in the provision of first-party benefits than in the tort system.
12. See, e.g., Bertotti v. Charlotte Motor Speedway, 893 F. Supp. 565, 570 (W.D.N.C.
1995); Potter v. Nat'l Handicapped Sports, 849 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (D. Colo. 1994).
13. See, e.g., Homac Corp. v. Sun Oil Co., 180 N.E. 172 (N.Y. 1932); Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
14. See, e.g., Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 669 (Ind. 2000) (holding that plaintiff
healthcare worker is better able to avoid injury to herself); Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
543 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Wis. 1996) (holding that letting mental healthcare worker recover would
impose an unreasonable burden on the institutionalized mentally ill). See generally, Sarah Light,
2007]
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I readily acknowledge that the plaintiffs in the examples above, save the homeowner
victimized by the city-wide fire, are probably better precaution takers against their
injuries than are the defendants, and the less generous treatment of plaintiffs could be
explained on that ground as well. The professional rescuer, the professional racecar
driver, and the healthcare worker benefit from specialized training in dealing with the
risk to themselves from the defendants' negligence and hence have an unusually good
opportunity, compared both to other plaintiffs and to defendants, to minimize that risk.
Furthermore, with the risk of injury to themselves being so significant and widely
known, the plaintiffs, their employers, and their representatives, such as NASCAR,
possess at least some practical opportunity to keep potential plaintiffs who are injury-
prone or especially vulnerable off the job altogether. 15 I do not attempt to divine
whether courts that treat the suits of these plaintiffs less generously are more influenced
by plaintiff being a premium planner or a better precaution taker than defendant. Either
ground warrants reduced enthusiasm for liability.
In all contexts in which the plaintiff is a premium planner for his injuries, this
Article argues, the court should ask whether the social gain from imposing liability for
ordinary negligence, which lies primarily in the improved safety from liability's
deterrence of defendant's negligence, is likely modest.1 6 When plaintiff is a premium
planner, courts should not assume liability will improve deterrence but rather should
consider the actual likelihood of deterrence in the context before it. For example, a
number of reasons suggest the safety gain from the new liability that would be created
by abolishing the fireman's rule is likely modest. To begin with, the defendants'
negligent creation of these perils endangers their own property and themselves, unlike,
for example, the negligence of product manufacturers in selling their products and of
physicians in treating their patients. Hence the instinct of self-preservation and the wish
to protect their familiess, their possessions, their homes, or their businesses give crime
Note, Rejecting the Logic of Confinement: Care Relationships and the Mentally Disabled Under
Tort Law, 109 YALE L.J. 381 (1999).
15. These three contexts also share the feature of plaintiff's consent to encounter the risk
that materialized. But emphasizing plaintiff's consent has led to the unsatisfactory jurisprudence
of the increasingly defunct doctrine of assumption of risk. That doctrine required courts and
juries to answer such unanswerable inquiries as whether plaintiff consented to the risks created
by defendant's negligence or merely the normal risks of plaintiff's work, whether the plaintiff
knew and appreciated the frequency and severity of the risks defendant created, and whether
plaintiff's decision to encounter those risks was "voluntary."
16. One may fairly question how a court is to ascertain whether the safety payoff from
liability in the context before it is likely modest. I am sensitive to the evils of foisting on a court
ajudgment it cannot become competent to reach. But a court handling a negligence case should
be able to identify the precautions the plaintiff claims defendant was negligent for not taking. At
that point a court should be able to assess, as a matter of common sense, the likelihood that fear
of liability will lead a defendant to take those precautions. Moreover, a court can consider any
empirical evidence suggesting that liability will improve safety in that context. Courts have
rejected some actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress partly based on their
conclusion that defendant already possessed other incentives for taking the precautions that
plaintiff has proposed and, hence, that allowing the tort action would not improve safety. See,
e.g., Lawson v. Mgmt. Activities, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. App. Ct. 1999) (noting that an
airline's risk of loss from crashing its plane guards against their "moral indifference to the
possibility of injury [to those on the ground]" and that "[n]othing is to be gained by extending
the liability attendant upon air crashes to the emotional distress of ground spectators.").
[Vol. 82:745
A FRESH LOOK AT THE FIREMAN'S RULE
victims and home and business owners incentive to avoid these perils.'7 How many
homeowners would cease smoking in bed because of the risk of this liability who have
not already ceased this behavior because of its risk to their home, their health and life,
and the health and life of their family? Liability's deterrence value depends, after all,
on its marginal contribution to safety. In addition, the first-party property insurers of
home and business owners usually offer these potential defendants the incentive of
lower premiums for taking precautions against these perils. Examples of such
precautions are fireproofing and installing fire alarms and sprinkler systems. Most
importantly, there is almost no chance that the defendants' liability insurers will
increase defendants' premiums or cancel their coverage, based on their precautions
against, or their past record of, injuring rescuers.' 8 This separates potential defendants
sharply from car drivers, a group which, at least some empirical evidence suggests,
drive more carefully because of well-founded fear that negligent driving will result in
increased liability insurance premiums or the cancellation of coverage.' 9 This also
separates the potential defendants here from product manufacturers who self-insure,
another group which, empirical evidence suggests, will increase spending on safety in
response to increased liability.
20
Whenever the plaintiff is a premium planner for his injuries and the safety gain from
imposing liability in the context before the court is likely modest, a court should next
consider whether the benefits of liability are outweighed by the costs of administering
17. The potential defendant's possession of first-party insurance on his property does not
eliminate his incentive to avoid perils that threaten his property. That insurance will not cover
the home or business owner's coinsurance, or his deductible, or the sentimental value of his
property. Nor do life and health insurance eliminate the insured's incentive to avoid death or
injury.
18. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 319 (noting that liability insurers for home and business
owners rarely experience rate, activity rate, or feature rate insureds. And unlike first-party
property insurers, they do not offer lower insurance premiums to insureds who take safety
measures); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555, 575-76
(1988) ("[So long as individual firms pay [for liability coverage] on the same basis, individual
accident records and safety measures will have no impact on premiums."). See Kenneth S.
Abraham, Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention: The Evolution of an Idea, 64 MD. L.
REv. 573, 576-608 (2005) (describing the lack of rating in liability insurance).
19. See Marc Gaudry, Measuring the Effects of the No-Fault 1978 Quebec Automobile
Insurance Act with the DRAG Model, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS 471, 494
(Georges Dionne ed., 1992); Richard W. Grayston, Deterrence in Automobile Liability
Insurance-The Empirical Evidence, 40 INS. CouNs. J. 117, 126 (1973); Elisabeth M. Landes,
Insurance, Liability and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of
No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 65 (1982); R. Ian McEwin, No-Fault and Road
Accidents: Some Australasian Evidence, 9 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 13, 23-24 (1989); Frank A.
Sloan, Bridget A. Reilly & Christoph M. Schenzler, Tort Liability Versus Other Approaches for
Deterring Careless Driving, 14 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 53, 68 (1994). But cf Craig Brown,
Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CAL. L. REv. 976, 986-89
(1985) (noting advent of no-fault seemed to decrease auto fatalities but previous prohibition of
experience or class rating undermines significance of this finding).
20. See Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based Compensation System for Product-
Related Injuries, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 669, 669-80 (1997) (summarizing the empirical evidence
of the deterrent value of product liability).
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that liability and by the liabilities' other disadvantages. 21 This Article attempts to show
how a court might undertake this calculus in the context of the fireman's rule. It
concludes that the calculus favors retaining the fireman's rule. More generally, it
argues that when the overall social costs of imposing liability for ordinary negligence
likely outweigh the social gains, courts should eliminate such liability by employing the
rubrics of "no duty" or "no proximate cause" if a more specific rubric like the
fireman's rule is unavailable.22 This look at the effects of expanding liability for
ordinary negligence to a domain of human activity historically free of it also provides
an opportunity to reconsider generally the continuing expansion of that liability.
The case against the fireman's rule echoes the case against the assumption of risk
defense. While the shortcomings of the assumption of risk defense justify its demise,23
the defense provided a vehicle through which courts expressed a number of policy
considerations that call for denying liability, many of which remain forceful and
legitimate. Hence the demise of the assumption of risk defense both increases the value
of other doctrinal vehicles, such as the fireman's rule, through which courts can
21. Some scholars write as if liability is socially desirable as long as it adds more incentive
for the defendant to take some cost-justified precautions against injury. But this is plainly
erroneous when the safety gain from those precautions is modest and the administrative costs of
suit are substantial. See infra notes 175-179 and accompanying text. From a social perspective,
the administrative costs of the tort system are no less a part of the cost of accidents than the
direct losses of the injured. GuiDo CALABRESi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 225 (1970); SHAVELL,
ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 11, at 269. While this has long been recognized, and while the goal
of reducing the overall costs of accidents has long been embraced, CALABRESI, supra, at 26,
relatively few scholars have considered that reducing these administrative costs through rules
that constrict liability, like the fireman's rule, may be the best way achieve that goal. For an
exception, see JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN 159-60
(1979) (constricting liability when first-party benefits are substantial may reduce overall costs of
accidents).
22. I believe the creation of the Victims Compensation Fund for the victims of 9/11
reflected the congressional judgment that when, for whatever reason, tort liability is unlikely to
deter a defendant's wrongdoing, it is better to compensate through what amounts to first-party
methods and to eliminate costly lawsuits. See also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 284 (2004) [hereinafter SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS] ("Thus,
the use of the liability system will be socially worthwhile if and only if the savings from accident
reduction it brings about exceed its administrative costs."); SHAVELL, ACCIDENT LAW, supra
note 11, at 269 ("[B]ecause the administrative costs of the liability system seem to be large, the
incentives toward safety created by the liability system must be substantial to warrant its use.
Yet these incentives may not always be very strong, especially when account is taken of factors
other than liability that operate to reduce risk.... Where the added incentives created by the
liability system are not sufficient to justify its use, we have seen that it may still be very much in
the private interests of victims who have sustained large losses to bring suit. Hence some sort of
social intervention may be required to reduce use of the liability system." (citation omitted)).
Granted, many other reasons for eliminating the tort liability of the airlines, the airline-security
companies, and the managers of the World Trade Center were given. For the possible state of
affairs if no Victims Compensation Fund had been passed and if the tort system had been
allowed to function normally, see infra text accompanying notes 223-231. Because most
plaintiffs in the 9/11 context were not premium planners for their injuries, as professional
rescuers are, the argument for rejecting tort liability in the context of the fireman's rule is
stronger.
23. For the shortcomings of the assumption of risk defense, see supra note 15.
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express these policy considerations and creates a need for new doctrinal vehicles
serving the same purpose. An example of another doctrinal vehicle that substitutes for
the assumption of risk doctrine is the "no duty" rule various courts have embraced to
bar suits against sports clubs by spectators who are injured by baseballs or hockey
pucks that enter the stands. An example of a new doctrinal vehicle that substitutes for
the assumption of risk doctrine is the requirement that an injured sporting participant
show recklessness, and not merely negligence, to recover from a fellow participant who
injured him.24 Another new doctrinal vehicle would be the rule that exculpatory
agreements signed by an injured patron of a recreational vendor will be enforced when
the patron is injured in a context in which he possesses ample ability to protect himself,
unless the patron shows the recreational vendor acted outrageously in regard to the
patron's safety.
2 5
I. EXPLANATION OF THE FIREMAN'S RULE
Whether the fireman's rule applies is an issue for the court.26 As the fireman's rule
goes to the threshold question of whether a defendant bears a duty of care toward the
injured rescuer, applying the rule usually results in dismissal based on "no duty. 27 In
some states, however, the burden of pleading and proving that the rule applies falls on
the defendant.28
Jurisdictions disagree considerably about the exceptions to and the scope of the
fireman's rule. In some jurisdictions retaining the rule, the rule seems but a prelude to
its exceptions. 29 A prominent exception arises when the defendant negligently injures
rescuers after those rescuers have arrived at the scene. a Under this exception, a
fireman injured when the defective front steps of a home collapsed while he was en
route to a kitchen to douse a negligently started kitchen fire would be barred by the
fireman's rule from suing the defendant homeowner for negligently starting the fire.
But the fireman could still sue the homeowner for negligently failing to warn him, after
24. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710-11 (Cal. 1992) (concluding that a touch-
football player must show recklessness, not merely negligence, in order to recover from another
player who injured him).
25. See Robert Heidt, The Avid Sportsman and the Scope for Self-Protection: When
Exculpatory Clauses ShouldBe Enforced, 38 U. RiCH. L. REv. 381 (2004) (arguing that in the
absence of outrageous behavior by, for example, a ski area, an exculpatory clause signed by a
skier should be enforced to protect the ski area from liability for injuries the skier suffers when
skiing-a context in which a skier possesses an opportunity to protect himself-but should not
be enforced to protect a ski area from liability for the collapse of a chair lift).
26. Espinoza v. Schulenburg, 108 P.3d 936, 940 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005), vacated on other
grounds, 129 P.3d 937 (Ariz. 2006).
27. Vroegh v. J & M Forklift, 651 N.E.2d 121 (111.1995).
28. Schulenburg, 108 P.3d at 940.
29. For a succinct summary of exceptions, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.9 (West 1998).
30. A rescuer injured by a defendant's negligence that occurs after the rescuer arrives on the
scene, although not affected by the fireman's rule, may yet be barred from recovery by familiar
no-duty rules. Examples include the "no duty to rescue" rule, which may shield from liability a
defendant whose negligence after the rescuer arrives consists of nonfeasance as opposed to
misfeasance, and the rules that limit the duty of those occupying premises to licensees.
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he reached the scene, of the defective condition of the steps.3' Likewise, some courts
hold the fireman's rule does not apply to negligence that is "separate and apart" from
the negligence which brought the rescuer to the scene. 32 Hence the fireman in the
example above could also sue a homeowner for her earlier negligence in failing to
maintain the steps, provided the court found that her negligent maintenance was
sufficiently separate and apart from the negligence that started the kitchen fire and
brought the firemen to the scene. A different result would be reached in those
jurisdictions that apply the fireman's rule as long as the rescuer is injured while
responding to an emergency.33 Courts invoking this limit implicitly require the
defendant to show that an emergency, however defined, existed. But once an
emergency is shown, the fireman's rule will apply regardless of whether the
defendant's negligence brought the rescuer to the scene or occurred months before the
rescuer's arrival.34 Accordingly, the firefighters in the example above would be barred
from suing for the defendant's negligent failure to maintain the steps. But if the
firefighter was injured by the steps collapsing during a non-emergency visit to the
defendant's premises, his suit would not be barred by the fireman's rule.35 In some
jurisdictions, however, any negligence by a potential defendant that causes injury to a
rescuer when the rescuer is acting within the scope of his employment is subject to the
rule.
36
In most states the fireman's rule will not shield intentional wrongdoers from
liability.37 Hence a home or business owner who commits arson in response to which
firefighters or police are injured may not invoke the rule. 38 Nor will the rule shield
31. E.g., Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 45 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Minn. 1951)
(manufacturing plant owner incurred liability after failing to warn firefighters of known
instability of a concrete wall).
32. See Wiley v. Redd, 885 P.2d 592, 594-95 (Nev. 1994).
33. See Gray v. Russell, 853 S.W.2d 928, 930-31 (Mo. 1993); Labrie v. Pace Membership
Warehouse, 678 A.2d 867, 869-70 (R.I. 1996) (limiting the fireman's rule to rescuers injured
during emergencies).
34. See, e.g., Lee v. Luigi, Inc., 696 A.2d 1371 (D.C. 1997) (policeman who slipped on oil
while responding to suspected burglary unable to sue); Day v. Caslowitz, 713 A.2d 758 (R.I.
1998) (policeman who slipped on ice while investigating activated security alarm unable to sue).
35. The suit may still face obstacles created by the rules limiting the duty of premise owners
or occupiers. E.g., Knorpp v. Hale, 981 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App. 1998) (the only duty of an
occupier of premises to a licensee on the premises is to warn of dangerous conditions on the
premises that the licensee is not likely to discover himself).
36. E.g., Gottas v. Consol. Rail Corp., 623 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that "the application of the fireman's rule is not limited to emergency situations").
37. Gibbons v. Caraway, 565 N.W.2d 663 (Mich. 1997) (intentional and willful or wanton
conduct renders application of the fireman's rule unjust); Migdal v. Stamp, 564 A.2d 826 (N.H.
1989) (same); Clark v. Corby, 249 N.W.2d 567 (Wis. 1977) (same).
38. E.g., Grable v. Varela, 564 P.2d 911 (Ariz. 1977). I suspect the exception arises
because the defendant's behavior is more culpable than ordinary negligence, not because the
defendant intended to damage his property. A farmer who lawfully but intentionally burned
down an old barn in order to clear land, I predict, will still be allowed to invoke the fireman's
rule should he be sued by a fireman who was injured in attempting to control the fire. One
would think both this exception and the exception for negligence after the professional rescuer
arrived on the scene would allow police to sue drivers who fail to heed a police demand to
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those who misrepresent to rescuers the extent of the hazards facing them.39 Another
exception arises for rescuers injured by a defendant's ultrahazardous conditions, such
as a defendant's storage of explosives or toxic chemicals.40 Some courts narrow the
fireman's rule further by refusing to apply it when a defendant has violated an
ordinance or safety statute aimed specifically at preventing fires or at protecting
firemen or policemen.4'
Because the rescuer's injury often occurs while entering the defendant's premises,
an occasional court will suggest that a necessary relation exists between the fireman's
rule and the rules regarding premises liability and hence can be invoked only by those
defendants who occupy the premises on which the injury occurred. 2 This is much the
minority view. Most courts have concluded that the rules of premises liability have
little to do with the policies implicated when rescuers suffer injuries during a rescue
attempt.4 3 Hence, those courts allow virtually any potential defendant, whether an
individual or entity, who has triggered a police or fire emergency to invoke the rule.
Nor does the defendant need to show the rescuer's injury occurred on the defendant's
premises. 44
If only to limit the scope of this Article, the fireman's rule should be kept distinct
from the related rule, sometimes called the municipal cost recovery rule or the free
public services doctrine, which bars a government entity, typically a municipality, from
recovering the costs of public services occasioned by a private tortfeasor's
wrongdoing.45 For example, private tortfeasors who have negligently started a fire may
invoke the municipal cost recovery rule to escape having to reimburse the government
entity for its expenses in suppressing the fire. One of the rationales for the municipal
cost recovery rule, namely, that governments ought not seek reimbursement through
tort suits for public service expenditures,46 resembles the community benefit rationale
for the fireman's rule that is discussed in the next section. Another rationale for the
"stop" when the police are injured in the subsequent chase. But see Gail v. Clark, 410 N.W.2d
662 (Iowa 1997).
39. E.g., Lipson v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 822, 828-29 (Cal. 1982).
40. Amy J. Fanzlaw, Comment, "A Sign of the Times: " How the Firefighter's Rule and the
No-Duty-to-Rescue Rule Impact Convenience Stores'Liabilityfor Failure to Aida Public Safety
Officer, 23 STETSON L. REv. 843, 853-54 (1994). Although the fireman's rule does not apply
when perils are triggered by ultrahazardous activities, the rule will protect sellers of defective
products that trigger an emergency. See Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
41. E.g., Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 886-88 (Ill. 1960).
42. See e.g., Court v. Grzelinski, 379 N.E.2d 281,283-85 (111. 1978) (because the rule grew
out of the old premises liability case, the rule only shields from liability occupiers of premises).
43. E.g., Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 119 (Ct. App. 1968) (rejecting any
significance of premises liability principles and allowing the rule to be invoked against a
fireman who never entered defendant's property); Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace P'ship, 520
A.2d 361 (Md. 1987) (same).
44. Kreski v. Modem Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 415 N.W.2d 178 (Mich. 1987);
Steelman v. Lind, 634 P.2d 666 (Nev. 1981).
45. See generally Timothy D. Lytton, Should Government Be Allowed to Recover the Costs
of Public Services from Tortfeasors?: Tort Subsidies, the Limits of Loss Spreading, and the
Free Public Services Doctrine, 76 TUL. L. REv. 727 (2002) (discussing the free public services
doctrine also known as municipal cost recovery rule).
46. Allenton Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Soo Line R.R., 372 F. Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Wis.
1974); Town of Howard v. Soo Line R.R., 217 N.W.2d 329, 330 (Wis. 1974).
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municipal cost recovery rule relies on the peculiar nature of a state or local government
as a tort plaintiff. Because these plaintiffs are viewed as intangible persons who cannot
be assaulted, slandered, or injured like an individual, the only common law rights they
enjoy are property rights.47 Thus they can only recover for a violation of their propertyS 48
rights, such as damage to public lands, buildings, or equipment. They may not attack
behavior by private persons that merely triggers government expenditures.49
The existence of the municipal cost recovery rule bears on the wisdom of abolishing
the fireman's rule. Not only are both rules informed by some similar concerns, but if
the fireman's rule is abolished, the municipal cost recovery rule may prevent
government entities that have provided rescuers substantial first-party benefits from
reimbursing themselves through a subrogation action against the private tortfeasor. If
the subrogation action is barred, the rescuer, by taking advantage of the collateral
source rule, can recover all his tort damages with no obligation to pay back anything to
his first-party-benefit providers.50 The taxpayers who pay the first-party benefits are
never reimbursed, their costs of providing the benefits are never reduced, and the
duplicate recovery of the benefits yields a windfall for the rescuer.51
II. THE PROS AND CONS OF THE RULE WITHOUT REGARD TO THE
RESCUER BEING A PREMIUM PLANNER FOR HIS INJURIES
A. The Common Rationales for the Rule and the Objections to Them
The most common rationale argues that these rescuers consent to taking the
increased risks inherent in their chosen profession, some of which inevitably arise from
the negligence of the public. Under this rationale, courts focus on separating the
increased risks inherent in the profession from risks that are not. 52 The New York
Court of Appeals illustrated this rationale:
47. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n v. Cobb, 2 S.E.2d 565, 567 (N.C. 1939).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The rescuer's ability to recover for all his special damages in his tort suit, such as his
medical and rehabilitative expenses and lost wages, will also, as a practical matter, increase his
recovery of general damages, such as damages for pain and suffering. STEPHEN CARROLL, ALLAN
ABRAHAMSE & MARY E. VAIANA, THE COSTS OF EXCESS MEDICAL CLAIMS FOR AUTOMOBILE
PERSONAL INJURIES 9 (1995). Because liability insurers tend to overpay small tort claims against
their insureds, a successfl claim by a rescuer for a small injury will almost always result in
duplicate payment. Indeed, small injuries, which a rescuer might ignore altogether if he is
limited to his first-party benefits, may well lead to both a claim for those benefits and a tort
claim in the hope that the defendant's liability insurer will settle the small tort claim generously
enough to justify the inconvenience of advancing those claims. Much waste results. P. S.
ATrYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY 133-34 (1997) (limiting recovery to first-party benefits "saves
money for the benefit of all by eliminating trivial and duplicated claims").
51. The dispute about the fireman's rule should also be kept distinct from the dispute about
whether injured professional rescuers should be able to sue their colleagues, and hence their
public employer, for their negligence, at least when their colleagues or their employer violated
state laws or internal rules. See Kevin Flynn, Police Demand a Right to Sue ifBroken Rules
Cause Injuries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, § 1, at 31 (reporting that the New York legislature
has considered a statute that would allow such suits).
52. Maltman v. Sauer, 530 P.2d 254, 257 (1975) (embracing consent rationale).
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For example, if a police officer who is simply walking on foot patrol is injured by
a flower pot that fortuitously falls from an apartment window, the officer can
recover damages because nothing in the acts undertaken in the performance of
police duties placed him or her at increased risk for that accident to happen. 53
On the other hand, the rescuers in the consolidated cases before the Court were
injured by risks inherent in their profession and were barred from suing. In one case,
the police officer "slipped and fell on a snow-covered [and negligently maintained]
metal plate as he was approaching a picketer who was packing snowballs, presumably
to throw at departing buses. 54 In another consolidated case, two police officers were
injured while "rushing down a flight of [negligently maintained] stairs leading into the
subway in response to a radio call for assistance from another officer. ' , 55 In the other
consolidated case, two firemen were injured when, during a fire emergency, the wall of
a burning building collapsed on them.56 The consent rationale also explains the
unanimous agreement of courts that the rule does not apply when the rescuer is injured
in his capacity as a private citizen. 57 Hence an off-duty policeman asleep in his
apartment who is burned because of an electrician's negligent wiring is as able to
recover for that negligence as any private citizen would be.
The consent rationale suffers because many other public employees are allowed to
recover against negligent members of the public when risks inherent in the employees'
chosen vocation materialize. Highway and construction workers, mail carriers,
inspectors, and meter readers have long recovered from negligent members of the
public who injure them in the course of their work. 58 These employees know that their
chosen vocation will subject them to increased risks from negligently driven cars,
negligently controlled dogs, and negligently maintained private premises. Arguably,
they consent to these increased risks that "come with the territory" no less than
professional rescuers consent to the risks to which the fireman's rule applies.
A rationale closely related to the consent rationale emphasizes that professional
rescuers should not be able to sue for the very hazards that create a need for their
services and that they are paid and specially trained to confront.59 The analogy is to the
repair contractor cases which deny an action to a contractor hired to repair a dangerous
condition, like a rotting roof, when the contractor is injured in the course of the
53. Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Comm'n, 649 N.E.2d 1167, 1172 (N.Y. 1995).
Similarly, police are able to recover for injuries caused by negligent drivers who collide with
them or who create dangerous conditions. But see Gail v. Clark, 410 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Iowa
1987) (suggesting that the fireman's rule will bar suits by police against drivers who injure the
police by fleeing from them).
54. Zanghi, 649 N.E.2d at 1170.
55. Id. at 1171.
56. Id. at 1170.
57. J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORTLAw LiABLITY AND LITIGATION, § 39:29,
at 39-62 (2d ed. 2002).
58. E.g., Rivas v. Oxon Hill Joint Venture, 744 A.2d 1076, 1081 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2000) (holding that postal workers, sanitary and building inspectors, garbage men, and tax
collectors able to recover for negligence of the public); see, e.g., Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus.,
Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 351 (Cal. 1994).
59. Neighbarger, 882 P.2d 347.
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repair.60 That injured contractor is barred from suing the person, typically the person
hiring the contractor, whose earlier negligence led to the rotting of the roof. The
shifting of responsibility from the negligent party is sometimes said to be implicit in
the contractor accepting the work. Like the consent rationale, this rationale, which
might be called the raison d'etre rationale, suffers from the demise of the assumption
of risk defense to which it is closely akin. Also like the consent rationale the raison
d'etre rationale justifies denying a tort action to professional rescuers while allowing
an action to ordinary members of the public injured during their rescue attempts. One
cannot infer from the chosen work of ordinary members of the public that they consent
to dealing with police and fire perils. Nor does dealing with police and fire perils form
the public's raison d'etre. Nor is the public paid or specially trained to deal with those
perils.
Unlike the consent rationale, the raison d'etre rationale focuses more on whether,
from an objective perspective, dealing with negligently created risks without hope of
compensation for injury is an implicit term of the rescuer's employment than on
whether the rescuer "consented" to deal with such risks. One implication is that the
consent rationale more clearly calls for applying the fireman's rule to volunteer
firefighters. The raison d'etre rationale, in contrast, suggests that the small or non-
existent pay the volunteer receives raises doubts about whether an implicit term of his
employment requires that he deal with negligently created risks without hope of tort
compensation. Similarly the raison d'etre rationale, compared to the consent rationale,
better justifies limiting the fireman's rule to professional rescuers and not extending it
to other public employees injured on the job by the negligence of the public. 6' While
highway and construction workers, mail carriers, inspectors, and gas meter readers may
foreseeably deal with risks created by the negligence of the public as a side effect of
their work, they are not so clearly paid or trained precisely for dealing with those risks.
In other words, dealing with those risks is not their raison d'etre. In contrast, dealing
with the risks that the public negligently creates is one of the very purposes for which
professional rescuers are paid and trained. While negligently created risks may come
upon the other public employees in the course of their work, such risks define the
rescuer's work. The professional rescuer's true workplace, as it were, is wherever these
risks arise.62 While the duties of other public employees may call for them to avoid, to
cope with, or to protect themselves against negligently created risks, the duty of
professional rescuers calls for them to confront and neutralize such risks.63
60. Taylor v. Moseley, 698 So. 2d 3, 6 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Peneschi v. Nat'l Steel Corp.,
295 S.E.2d 1, 11-12 (W. Va. 1982) (while an unrelated third party can recover for injuries, a
contractor and his employees cannot). See Oceanside v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621
(Ct. App. 2000) (injured lifeguard barred by the fireman's rule from suing fellow lifeguards or
public safety personnel). Insofar as animal control officers are hired to confront negligently
created animal perils, the raison d'etre rationale would also extend the fireman's rule to them.
61. The reduced first-party benefits these other public employees receive may also help to
explain, under this rationale, why the fireman's rule does not apply to them.
62. "In firefighting,... the unsafe conditions in the work environment are fundamental to
the occupation and are not subject to elimination by administrative action as they would be in
industry. Risk acceptance is essential to the task and sets this type of work apart from most other
occupations." WILLIAM CLARK, FIREFIGHTING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 201-203 (2d ed.
1991).
63. Unlike professional rescuers who are trained to confront danger, garbage men, for
[Vol. 82:745
A FRESH LOOK AT THE FIREMAN'S RULE
The raison d'etre rationale, and the repair contractor cases that illustrate it, also
suggest why concerns of corrective justice 64 support the fireman's rule. As the term is
used here, corrective justice calls for tort liability only when liability is needed in order
to redress the wrong which the injured plaintiff rightly feels the defendant, by her
negligence, has inflicted upon him. Liability thus leaves the injured plaintiff feeling
that defendant and he are now "even." But no repair contractor hired to repair a rotted
roof will feel wronged by the party whose negligence led to the roof rotting. True, that
party's negligence has indirectly endangered the repair contractor and has led to his
injury. But when the danger is one the repair contractor is paid and specially trained to
confront, the repair contractor will not experience the infliction of that danger as a
wrong of any kind. While the repair contractor may deem the defendant a fool for her
negligence, defendant's negligence has not only created a demand for the repair
contractor's services but an opportunity for the repair contractor to demonstrate his
training, skill, and bravery and to obtain the defendant's indebtedness. Negligence that
creates such an opportunity for another usually does not trigger in the other a sense of
being wronged. A person who renders herself dependent on another and in need of
being rescued by the other puts herself in a subordinate posture and, if anything, suffers
an indignity rather than inflicts one. Nor will a doctor feel wronged by a patient who
negligently injured herself and whose treatment endangers the doctor. Nor will the
injured police or firefighter feel wronged by the crime victim or home or business
owner whose negligence led to a police or fire peril.65 Especially when the parties are
strangers before the peril arose, the potential defendant's negligence inflicts little if any
dignitary harm on the rescuer and gives the rescuer no reason to take defendant's
negligence personally. With no sense on plaintiff's part of defendant having wronged
him, there is no need under the goal of corrective justice for liability.66
example, are instructed not to attempt to pick up garbage when they see that doing so would
endanger them.
64. "Corrective justice" carries different meanings. In England the term refers to what in
this country is typically called retributive justice, the wish to penalize wrongdoers regardless of
whether the plaintiff is deserving. See ATYAH, supra note 50, at 36. Others use the term to mean
the wish to redress any invasion of plaintiff's legal rights. E.g., Richard Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 168-69 (1973). As used here, corrective justice refers to
the wish to impose liability as a matter of justice between defendant and plaintiff, thereby
vindicating plaintiff's reasonable feeling that defendant has unfairly wronged him and rectifying
that wrong. For a similar concept of corrective justice, see ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN
ETics bk. 5, ch. 4 (J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson eds., David Ross trans., 1980) ("Now the judge
restores equality; it is as though there were a line divided into unequal parts, and he took away
that by which the greater segment exceeds the half, and added it to the smaller segment."). For a
view that subsumes corrective justice in distributional justice, see Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed
Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REv. 427 (1992).
65. Insofar as tort liability sends the message that the defendant has wronged the plaintiff,
abolishing the fireman's rule will encourage a rescuer to believe that defendant has wronged
him. See infra text accompanying notes 116-122.
66. Tort actions also serve the purpose of giving the injured plaintiff a non-violent method
of expressing his justifiable anger at the defendant. But much of the negligent behavior by the
defendants in this context, such as a defendant's failure to check the batteries in his smoke
alarm, seems unlikely to arouse anger. Moreover, the reasons given in the text which suggest
that the professional rescuer will not experience such negligence as a wrong to him also suggest
the rescuer will not harbor much anger toward these defendants. Less than 10% of victims of
2007]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
Another related rationale for the fireman's rule, which might be called the
community benefit rationale, maintains that the community's payment of a professional
rescuer's regular compensation package in effect buys protection for all members of
that community from the rescuer's suit. Protection from suit by the professional rescuer
is part of the consideration each taxpayer-member of the community receives in return
for her tax contribution to the rescuer's compensation package. One implication of this
rationale is that the fireman's rule would not apply to private professional rescuers.
Specialists in handling oil fires, like the famous "Red" Adair, exemplify the private
professional rescuer. Those hiring these private rescuers do not collect taxes from the
person whose negligence caused the peril, often have no relation with that person
whatsoever, and certainly are not compensating the private rescuer in order to persuade
him to forego his tort claims against that person.
67
Some courts invoking the raison d'etre or the community benefit rationale argue
that without the fireman's rule, the defendant would be made to pay twice to handle the
perils which bring the rescuer to the scene, once indirectly as a taxpayer funding the
compensation package of the rescuer and again as a tortfeasor. This argument suffers
from appearing to apply as well to other public employees like highway and
construction workers, mail carriers, inspectors, and readers of gas meters. Yet the
taxpayer's payment of workers compensation benefits and other first-party benefits to
these public employees in no way reduces her tort exposure to them should she
negligently injure them. Another objection to this double payment rationale argues that
double payment can be avoided by allowing the professional rescuer's first-party
insurers to bring subrogation claims against the tortfeasor for the benefits they
provided the injured professional rescuer. With the subrogation claims allowed, the
defendant taxpayer's payment as a tortfeasor would enable her, in theory, to reduce the
future taxes she owes the employer of the professional rescuer, thus avoiding double
payment.
Two further rationales dovetail so closely with the raison d'etre and community
benefit rationales that they could be seen merely as arguments in support of those
rationales. The first might be called the expectations rationale, for it simply asserts that
after paying taxes for police and firemen, the crime victim and home and business
negligently caused injuries remain angry at their injurers. Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 154 (2002).
A related reason for allowing tort actions is to give the injured plaintiff an opportunity to
regain his self-respect and self-esteem. But, again, there will usually be no reason to believe the
defendant's negligence has threatened the rescuer's self-respect or self-esteem. Yet another
related reason for allowing actions lies in the cathartic benefit from giving victims of trauma a
public forum in which to speak of their injury and its consequences. It seems unlikely that most
professional rescuers, in light of their typical background and attitude toward public expression
of their unhappiness, will attach much value to this benefit, which accrues in any event only to
those few rescuers whose suits are actually tried rather than settled.
67. E.g., Kowalski v. Gratopp, 442 N.W.2d 682 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing private
professional rescuers to sue unrelated third parties whose negligence triggered the peril in
response to which the rescuer was injured). While the community benefit rationale would
support suits by these private plaintiffs, neither the consent rationale nor the raison d'etre
rationale would. Not only do private professional rescuers consent to the risks which create a
demand for their services, they, no less than repair contractors, are paid to confront these risks
and receive a hazard premium for doing so. Like the repair contractor, therefore, they should not
be able to sue the person hiring them.
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owner expects that in a police or fire peril the professional rescuers will aid her without
threat of later suit regardless of whether the peril resulted from her negligence. As the
court in one leading case put it, "No one expects the rendering of a bill (other than a
tax bill) if a policeman apprehends a thief. '68 Were the rule abolished, another court
has stated, "expectations of both business entities and individuals, and of their insurers,
would be upset substantially." 69 The rationale seems to posit that the rescue efforts of
police and firefighters are the type of public activities whose costs the public has long
expected to absorb. In contrast, the public expects to pay for other public activities,
like those of the post office or of a public utility, based on the amount of individual
use. That difference in expectation about how these activities are funded, the argument
seems to be, leads to different expectations about whether the members of the public
should face liability when their negligent conduct harms the public employee
performing the activity. At bottom, the argument seems to reduce to the notion that
settled expectations, whatever their basis, should be protected. The second rationale,
which might be called the deference rationale, sees in the legislative or municipal
authorization of these police and firefighting activities a wish by those branches of
government to provide the activities free of charge. In other words, because the
legislature or municipality currently bears the cost of these activities and has taken no
action to shift that cost elsewhere-whether for reasons of economic efficiency or even
as a subsidy to the defendants-shifting these costs to defendants would interfere with
what may be a matter of fiscal policy committed to the discretion of the respective
legislative bodies.7 °
Yet another rationale-this one based on the benefits of spreading the cost of
injuries-points out that the fireman's rule spreads the risk of injuryto rescuers among
the wide base of the taxpaying members of the public. Abolishing the fireman's rule
means, foolishly, incurring transaction costs in order to reconcentrate that well-spread
risk. Even when the risk is spread to the liability insurers of the defendant crime
victims and home and business owners, rather than to those defendants personally, the
risk will not be spread as widely as under the fireman's rule. 1
Still another common rationale asserts that the fireman's rule is needed to avoid
placing a burden on occupiers ofpremises always to guarantee the reasonable safety of
their premises to strangers like the rescuers, even when they have no expectation of a
stranger entering.72 The rationale seems to posit that when no outsiders are expected,
such a burden is unreasonable. Occupiers should not need to take care for the safety of
rescuers who may suddenly descend on their premises in response to a peril and whose
68. City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc, 369 A.2d 49,54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). See
generally, Timothy D. Lytton, Should Government Be Allowed to Recover the Costs of Public
Services from Tortfeasors?: Tort Subsidies, the Limits of Loss Spreading, and the Free Public
Services Doctrine, 76 TUL. L. REv. 727 (2002).
69. City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir.
1983) (applying Arizona law).
70. Id. at 324.
71. "Government is a far better agency to distribute losses than individuals or most
businesses." Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 556 n.23 (1948). Abolishing the fireman's rule will reconcentrate
the loss from the rescuer's injury and then inflict that loss on one who may not have enough
liability insurance to spread it fully.
72. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 61, at 431 (5th ed. 1984).
2007]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
entry and behavior on their premises the occupiers are powerless to control. This
rationale does not explain application of the fireman's rule to injuries occurring outside
the occupiers' premises even though that is where most police emergencies occur. Nor
does the rationale explain why the rule shields from liability occupants who expect
strangers, whose premises are open to the public, or who have summoned the
professional rescuers. Nevertheless, this rationale helps to reply to one argument
against the fireman's rule. That argument maintains that the rule unjustifiably treats
rescuers more harshly than invitees such as the customers of an occupant's business
who are injured on the occupant's premises. But entry on her land by an invitee is
usually an entry an occupant can expect, prepare for, and control.73 Hence an
occupant's burden to keep her premises reasonably safe for the entry of rescuers, who
may come at any time and without warning, exceeds her burden to keep her premises
reasonably safe for invitees. Imposing the lesser burden of taking care for invitees does
74not implicitly call for imposing the greater burden of taking care for rescuers.
Furthermore, the occupant can argue, the professional rescuer is less deserving of the
occupant's care than is an invitee because the rescuer is duty bound to serve the
interest of the public throughout his intrusion while the invitee is more likely to serve
the interest of the occupant.
A final rationale, which might be called the reciprocity rationale, deems the
fireman's rule an appropriate counterpart to the rule that prevents crime victims and
home and business owners from maintaining a suit against professional rescuers whose
negligence injures them. 75 Such suits against professional rescuers are routinely
dismissed under the rubric of "no duty., 76 In contrast, crime victims or home or
business owners who are injured by the negligence of a private party who has
73. This rationale also helps to justify treating policemen and firemen less generously than
other public employees, such as readers of gas meters, who are injured on an occupant's
premises. The occupier of premises knows that from time to time the reader of his gas meter will
enter his premises; in contrast the occupier has no idea whether police or firemen ever will and
thus lacks the same opportunity to take precautions for their safety.
74. Unlike the community benefit rationale and the double payment argument, both of
which rely in part on the significance of the professional rescuer's regular compensation
package, this rationale of avoiding an unreasonable burden on the occupier, like the consent
rationale, calls for applying the fireman's rule to volunteer firemen despite their lack of regular
compensation. Compare Roberts v. Vaughn, 543 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
(grounding the fireman's rule on the professional rescuer's consent to encounter the risks and
hence applying the rule to volunteer firemen) with Baker v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. Rptr. 311,
318 (Ct. App. 1982) (grounding the rule on the first-party compensation package the
professional rescuer receives).
75. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989).
Admittedly, modem courts are struggling with whether and when a professional rescuer who
makes a specific commitment toward a member of the public will be charged with a duty of care.
See Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937, 940 (N.Y. 1987) (setting forth four factors that
would charge police with a duty of care toward an injured member of the public).
76. Even with the fireman's rule, a well-established exception to that rule provides that the
crime victim or home or business owner loses her immunity to an injured professional rescuer
when that defendant's negligence takes place after the rescuer has arrived on the scene. See
supra text accompanying notes 30-32. Negligent professional rescuers, in contrast, remain
immune from suit by those they injure regardless of when their negligence occurred.
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attempted to rescue them may sue the private party. 7 Arguably the immunity
professional rescuers enjoy when they negligently injure crime victims or home or
business owners renders only fair the immunity these potential defendants enjoy under
the fireman's rule when they negligently injure professional rescuers.
The more hostile treatment the fireman's rule accords professional rescuers
compared to other workers injured on the job becomes especially conspicuous and,
perhaps, hard to justify when the defendant is not a victim of crime or a maintainer of
premises but a manufacturer of a product whose defect led to the peril in response to
which the rescuer was injured. 78 For example, a defective product used in a business
may start a fire that injures both workers in the business and responding firefighters.
While the fireman's rule bars the firefighters from suing the product's manufacturer,
the workers in the business face no such impediment. Neither the injured workers'
ability to receive worker's compensation and other first-party benefits, nor their
knowledge about the likelihood of the product triggering a peril, nor the fact that
dealing with the manufacturer's product was part of, and a reason for, their work
prevents them from suing the manufacturer. 79 Juxtaposing the different treatment of the
workers and the rescuers embarrasses the fireman's rule. Perhaps one difference
between rescuers and these workers is pertinent, however: the product manufacturer
may be a better precaution taker against injuries to her customer's workers should the
product trigger a peril than against injury to the professional rescuers. As a by-product
of manufacturing the product, the manufacturer will learn about the perils that the
product can trigger and about the precautions for dealing with these perils. But while
the manufacturer may face little difficulty instructing and training the workers of her
customers about dealing with these perils, the manufacturer may face greater difficulty
instructing and training the professional rescuers, who lack any connection to the
manufacturer and are farther removed from the product. Moreover the safety gain from
the manufacturer's efforts to instruct and train the professional rescuers may be less.
8 0
The professional rescuer's other training in protecting himself should exceed the
worker's, rendering more of his training by the manufacturer redundant. Insofar as the
peril has partly passed by the time the rescuer arrives on the scene, the safety gain from
the manufacturer's efforts to instruct and train the rescuer should be less.
Apart from the disparate treatment of rescuers and workers, the question arises
whether workers, insofar as they are premium planners against their on-the-job injuries,
should be barred from suing manufacturers of defective products that injure them. But
there are reasons for finding that the social gain from tort liability's deterrence is more
77. Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 287 N.Y.S. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 324 (1965).
78. Police and firefighters may ordinarily sue manufacturers of defective products that
injure them, such as the manufacturer of a defective weapon. The fireman's rule only bars suit
when the product defect led to the peril in response to which the police or firemen were injured.
See Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (C.D. Pa. 1985).
79. Product liability suits by workers against the manufacturers and sellers of defective
products which injure the worker in the workplace account for roughly 60% of all product
liability suits.
80. True, the manufacturer of a defective product is clearly the better precaution taker
against the defect, and hence against the peril itself, than is the professional rescuer. Indeed
potential defendants will invariably be better precaution takers against the peril than is the
professional rescuer.
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significant in the context of the manufacturer of a defective product and the workers of
her customers. Unlike most defendants in the context of the fireman's rule (or a car
driver or plane pilot), the manufacturer of a defective product will rarely endanger
herself should the product's defect endanger her customer's worker. No instinct for
self-preservation will inspire the manufacturer to take precautions against the danger to
these workers. Nor are the manufacturer's other incentives to avoid endangering her
customer's workers so compelling or self-evident that a court can be confident the
marginal effect of tort liability on manufacturer precaution taking is modest. Hence a
court, applying the calculus suggested here, might retain the current liability on the
manufacture of a defective product which injures her customer's worker, regardless of
whether the worker is a premium planner for his injuries.8 2
B. Other Concerns
While the common rationales for the fireman's rule and the objections to them
provide ample arguments for retaining or abolishing the rule, their shortcomings
suggest the value of a fresh look at the rule. How does the retention or abolition of the
rule affect the proof problems the factfinder will encounter, the resources devoted to
litigation, and the power of a rescuer and his attorneys vis-A-vis the crime victim,
home, or business owner defendants? How might abolishing the rule affect the
behavior or perceived behavior of professional rescuers during emergencies or of the
public investigators during their investigation of the emergencies? Might the rescuer's
prospect of tort recovery from these defendants affect the dlan of the squad or the
perception of the rescuer's profession? Might the decisions by professional rescuers to
sue some negligent defendants but not others smack of unjustifiable discrimination? To
what extent do concerns of retributive justice and deterrence of defendant's negligence
call for abolishing the rule? And might the abolition of the rule encourage crime
victims and imperiled home or business owners to choose self-help rather than to
summon the professionals?
1. Proof Problems With and Without the Rule
The fireman's rule will generally avoid the proof problems of ascertaining whether
the defendant was negligent in triggering the peril and whether that negligence was a
cause in fact of the professional rescuer's injury. But the rule inflicts on the judicial
system the proof problems connected with ascertaining whether its exceptions apply.
Hence the fireman's rule may require the factfinder to ascertain whether the
defendant's negligence occurred after the rescuer arrived on the scene, whether the
defendant's negligence was separate and apart from the negligence which brought the
81. To be sure, the customer's wish to purchase his business products from a manufacturer
who will preserve the safety of the customer's workers gives the manufacturer some incentive
for precaution taking on behalf of those workers. On the other hand, the customer's preference
for products that will safeguard his workers is reduced to some extent by the customer's blanket
immunity from tort liability for injuries to his workers that is afforded by worker's compensation
laws.
82. If workers are rightly seen as "premium planners" for these injuries, then, despite the
arguments suggested here, the approach recommended in this Article raises doubt about
continuing to allow them to sue those who supply products to their employers.
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rescuer to the scene, or whether the defendant was guilty of intentional wrongdoing or
of violating a statute intended for the protection of professional rescuers. Each
exception requires a court to determine not only whether the defendant's behavior fit
the exception, but also whether that behavior was a cause in fact of the rescuer's
injuries.
These proof problems of ascertaining whether an exception to the fireman's rule
applies do not seem daunting. Placing defendants' negligence before or after the
professional rescuers arrived, for example, should be straightforward if only because
the rescuers themselves are likely to be witnesses to any negligence occurring after
they arrive. To be sure, resolving the "but for" issue to decide cause in fact may be
more difficult just because ascertaining how and why injuries came about during an
emergency is generally difficult. Likewise, applying the exception for negligence that
is separate and apart from the negligence that triggered the peril presents the problem
of ascertaining whether that separate negligence was a "but for" cause of the rescuer's
injury. For example, suppose the alleged separate negligence was negligent
maintenance of the steps of a burning building, which occurred long before the
negligence that triggered the fire. To meet the "but for" test, a fireman injured when the
steps collapsed under him would need to show that the steps probably would not have
collapsed had they been maintained with ordinary care. But if the fire that brought the
firemen to the scene reached the steps themselves, the "but for" test will require the
factfinder to separate the effects on the steps of the fire from the effects on the steps of
the earlier negligent maintenance.
How do these proof problems of the fireman's rule compare to the proof problems
of abolishing the rule? With the fireman's rule abolished, factfinders will confront in
every case the issues of whether defendant was negligent and whether her negligence
caused the peril. When the peril is a fire, for example, the factf'mder must determine
whether the defendant was negligent in creating an unreasonable risk of a fire and
whether that negligence caused the fire. Determining the cause of fires is notoriously
difficult, if only because the fire and its aftermath often destroys the crucial evidence.
Typically expert testimony is needed and is dispositive.83 When the fire investigators
assert that the fire was caused by defendant's negligence, defendant will face, at least,
considerable expense in challenging that assertion. These proof problems are
compounded by the official investigators being colleagues, or at least coworkers, of the
plaintiff-rescuer. Some fire investigators, for example, may feel bound by the
traditionally strong sense of solidarity among firefighters to help their comrade on the
force recover from the stranger-defendant. One need not be cynical to assert that
abolishing the fireman's rule will increase proof problems by raising new doubts about
the impartiality of the official investigation.
Even when the historic facts about the defendant's behavior are clear, it may be
inappropriate for a jury to evaluate whether that behavior was negligent. Consider the
problems of inviting the jury to second-guess a defendant crime victim's precautions
against being victimized. When a policeman is injured while responding to a mugging,
the jury might find the defendant victim of the mugging negligent because she was
83. See TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON FIRE/ARsoN SCENE INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, FIRE AND ARSON SCENE EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC
SAFETY PERSONNEL 3-5 (2000) (emphasizing the difficulty of determining, after the fact, the
cause of a fire).
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walking alone in a high crime area.84 Such a finding may undervalue the importance of
the defendant's interest in being free to walk in public areas without fear that her doing
so will be held against her should she be mugged. There is something to be said for the
notion that persons, even in high crime areas, should be able to go about their business
without regard to the possibility that they are inadvertently inviting crimes.
Succumbing to the risk of crime by avoiding any behavior inviting crimes, some would
argue, concedes too much to the criminals. A number of commentators have argued
that juries, in assessing whether a defendant was negligent, fail to give sufficient weight
to the abstract, non-safety values that defendant would sacrifice by foregoing her
allegedly negligent behavior.8 5 Rather, the jury, with the injuries of a professional
rescuer before them, will tend to overweigh the safety interest in avoiding the peril and
will thus call too quickly for more precaution taking by defendant.
Whether a crime victim took sufficient measures to prevent the crime resembles
what Professor Henderson has called a polycentric issue, namely an issue where the
many relevant factors are related to one another in such a way that it is impossible for a
decision-maker to address himself to any one factor apart from a consideration of the
others.86 Asking "whether defendant created an unreasonable risk ofbecoming a crime
victim and triggering a police peril" seems just as polycentric a question as "whether a
basketball coach picked the most effective group of five players to play together" or
"whether a parole board negligently granted a parole."87 As Professor Henderson has
argued, polycentric issues are often too open-ended for resolution by a jury. Ignoring
the jury's incapacity to resolve polycentric issuers so leaves the party's fate to the
jury's unfettered discretion as to threaten the rule of law. In short, abolishing the
fireman's rule and compelling a jury to decide whether a crime victim negligently
triggered the crime carries significant error and decision-making costs.88
84. Similarly, when a policeman is injured in responding to a rape, the jury might find the
defendant victim of the rape negligent for inviting the rape by her dress, location, or other
behavior.
85. Professor Gerla has reviewed the psychological literature suggesting that juries will
ignore many disadvantages of a plaintiff's proposed precaution. Harry S. Gerla, The
"Reasonableness" Standard in the Law of Negligence: Can Abstract Values Receive Their
Due?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 199, 205-14 (1990); see also Robert Heidt, The Avid Sportsman
and the Scope for Self-Protection: When Exculpatory Clauses Should Be Enforced, 38 U. RICH.
L. REv. 381, 423 (2004).
86. James A. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits ofAdjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1534-42 (1973) (discussing the problems
of polycentricity previously identified by Lon Fuller).
87. E.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 956-57 (3d Cir. 1980) (asking the jury
to determine whether a car is defectively designed under a risk-utility test).
88. The California Court of Appeals felt that abolishing the fireman's rule would lead to
further expansion of defendant's liability. Those expansions would entail inappropriate second-
guessing of defendants' behavior and yield liability disproportionate to defendants' culpability:
What of obvious expansions of [abolishing the fireman's rule]? Would an
ambulance driver, responding to a call to pick up victims of an automobile
collision caused by negligence, be allowed recovery from the negligent driver in
that first collision... ? What of an attendant or nurse in the contagious disease
ward of a public hospital? Would he be permitted recovery for an illness
contracted from a patient confined in that ward because of disease contracted
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If the fireman's rule is abolished, a negligent defendant can only resort to the
defense that the plaintiff-rescuer was contributorily negligent. 89 And in the era of
comparative negligence, even showing contributory negligence may only reduce the
damages the defendant must pay. The defendant will also need to establish that the
plaintiff's negligence was a cause in fact of his injury. This requires showing that, but
for the rescuer's contributory negligence, the rescuer would not have been injured, or
at least would not have been injured as severely. Defendants' proof problems on both
these elements are daunting. In the service of his case, the professional rescuer may
feel obliged to suppress any responsibility he bears for his injury and insist he was
following the prescribed or customary practice for a professional rescuer in his
position. In fire cases the key witnesses to the rescuer's behavior besides the rescuer
himself will often be the rescuer's brother firemen. Again, the traditionally strong sense
of solidarity among professional rescuers means fellow rescuers, even more than the
fire investigators, may feel bound by that solidarity to testify so as to help each other
recover from the stranger-defendant. On the issue of contributory negligence, as on
cause in fact, the strong solidarity between members of the force, so essential to the
work of the force, threatens the integrity of the litigation that would be unleashed by
abolishing the fireman's rule. While an industry of ready experts for both sides of the
contributory negligence issue is likely to develop in time, one suspects that in the years
immediately after the fireman's rule is abolished, rescuers will enjoy a decisive
advantage in finding experts.
Moreover, evidence of the rescuer's contributory negligence may backfire on
defendant with the jury. A defendant may appear ungrateful in the jury's eyes just for
presenting such evidence. After all, the rescuer has deliberately endangered himself-
and been injured-in responding to a peril occasioned by defendant's negligence. The
jury may resent defendant for second-guessing the rescuer's behavior. Defendant's
lawyer may abandon the costly and difficult effort needed to adduce evidence of the
rescuer's contributory negligence in light of the risk that this evidence will alienate the
jury.
In sum, abolishing the fireman's rule would likely create greater proof problems and
related administrative concerns than exist under the rule. And while rules limiting
liability typically present fewer administrative concerns than rules expanding liability,
the administrative concerns created by abolishing the fireman's rule seem particularly
troubling.
2. Effect on Resources Devoted to Litigation
Even when narrowed by its exceptions, the fireman's rule avoids a substantial
amount of litigation. A significant percentage of emergencies to which professional
rescuers respond arise from negligence. The United States Fire Association estimates
that 77% of the calls for firefighters could be said to arise from negligence on the part
through the patient's negligent exposure of himself to the infection which caused
his own confinement?
Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 119, 123-24 (Ct. App. 1968).
89. Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976). In New York, the rescuer's contributory
negligence will not diminish his recovery. Mullen v. Zoebe, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 90, 92 (N.Y.
1995).
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of residents or owners of the building to which the firefighters are summoned.90 While
no comparable data is available for police emergencies, many surely arise from the
negligence of crime victims or of other parties besides the criminals themselves. 91
And a substantial percentage of potential defendants who are causally negligent will
be worth suing. Because of vicarious liability, the causal negligence of all business
employees is automatically attributed to the employing business. All standard liability
insurance policies for businesses cover this liability risk. The dollar limits of that
coverage are typically the highest of any part of the business's insurance coverage.
9 2
Generally the only businesses that lack such liability insurance are those large enough
to self-insure. They too will be worth suing. Because all standard homeowner's policies
include liability coverage for bodily injury to others on the insured premises when the
injury is caused by the negligence of an insured,93 individual homeowners will also be
worth suing
The costs to society of this new litigation extend well beyond the obvious costs to
the taxpayer and to other litigators from the added burden on courts and juries.94
Granted, the personal cost to the plaintiff rescuers should be discounted on the
assumption that they would not sue unless their expected benefits swamped their
expected costs. But even some rescuers who decide not to sue will expend some time
and energy to ascertain, invariably through meetings with lawyers, whether suit is
worth bringing. Beyond that, however, the new litigation will divert the time and
energy of rescuers, defendants, and witnesses, including public investigators, from
other pursuits. The defendants and witnesses, whether willingly or not, must endure the
litigation's phone calls, meetings, time at lawyers' offices, depositions, occasional
court appearances, as well as the time spent waiting for all of these, much ofwhich will
be spent waiting on the convenience of lawyers. The taxpayers may discover that in
order to maintain the requisite number of professional rescuers on duty, more must be
hired. 95 The fireman's rule, when it applies, avoids all these costs.
Once union and other representatives ofprofessional rescuers learn to exploit fully
the abolition of the fireman's rule, suits by rescuers, along with the subrogation claims
90. U.S. FIRE ADMIN., FIRE IN THE UNITED STATES 1992-2001 ch. 2 (2004), http://www.
usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fiusl 3/ch2.pdf.
91. Furstein v. Hill, 590 A.2d 939, 944 (Conn. 1991) (recognizing that a high percentage of
police perils are caused by negligence); Winn v. Frasher, 777 P.2d 722, 725 (Idaho 1989)
(same).
92. BEST'S INSURANCE REVIEW 37 (2003) (Even when a business has so few assets that no
first-party insurance is appropriate, $2 million is normally the lowest limit of liability coverage
obtained. Most businesses also purchase an umbrella policy for further liability coverage.).
93. See Insurance Information Institute, What is in a Standard Homeowner's Insurance
Policy?, http://www.iii.org/individuals/homei/hbasics/whatisin/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2007). Of
course, those few individuals who have more comprehensive liability insurance than that
provided by the typical homeowner's policy will likewise be worth suing.
94. In 1990, figures published for the Superior Courts of Orange County, California showed
an annual cost to the taxpayers of $380,000 for one courtroom, including the salaries of the
judge, bailiff, clerk, and court reporter. ROBERT V. WILLS, LAWYERS ARE KILLING AMERICA: A
TRIAL LAWYER'S APPEAL FOR GENUINE TORT REFORM 70 (1990).
95. Ronny J. Coleman, Will Firefighter Benefits Break the Chiefs Back?, FIRE CHIEF 18
(June 2003) (emphasizing the substantial replacement costs created by any job-related activity
that takes firefighters away from the squad room).
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by those providing first-party benefits (including the disputes between those
subrogated parties), 96 may constitute a noticeable fraction of judicial dockets. 97
Supported by union funds, lawyers specializing in these cases may appear on the scene
and routinize the practice of this new subspecialty. Liability insurers for potential
defendants will want their usual lawyers to learn to defend these cases just as they now
defend similar cases. Their wishes will create demand for increased instruction in
defending these cases. Industries of private investigators, paralegals, and expert
witnesses for both sides-attracted away from other pursuits-may develop.
98
An accounting of the costs of litigation must consider litigation's toxic and
protracted character. The incessant wrangling, especially throughout discovery, will
leave many professional rescuers and defendants dispirited. Discovery will often entail
extravagant spending of the currency of defendant's and witnesses' privacy. The
litigation will require all parties and witnesses to relive the circumstances of the injury
and to relive the peril generally. The litigation may stretch on for years, during which
the parties and witnesses experience stress, recriminations, bitterness, and frustration
with the system.
99
Any expansion of liability means more power to the plaintiff's lawyers to frustrate
and annoy potential defendants. Under the fireman's rule, crime victims and home or
business owners affected by a police or fire peril need not fear the plaintiff's attorneys
nosing themselves into the ultimate cause of the perils, at least when neither arson nor
other crimes are suspected. Abolishing the fireman's rule means extending the reach of
tort law into a domain of human activity that had been free of it. Plaintiff's lawyers will
be empowered to hit defendants with a mailing that will tie defendant up for years. Yet
the plaintiff's lawyer will be able to walk away with no sanction, and few consequences
of any kind, should his allegations of defendant's causal negligence prove unfounded.
Even the ultimately victorious defendant suffers the punishment of the process. While
plaintiff has volunteered to play the litigation game, defendants play it under
conscription. So great is the cost of the litigation game for uninsured defendants that
most industrialized countries provide public funds to help defray defense costs.'
0 0
96. See Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609,613 (Cal. 1977) ("[A]bolition ofthe fireman's rule
would burden our courts with litigation among the employer public agency, the retirement
system, and the negligence insurer"). Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 355 (Cal.
1994) (expressing the view that litigation of subrogation and indemnity claims would be
"pointless").
97. As Fleming James Jr. noted, the key factors which affect whether suits which the law
allows actually will be brought include "the extent to which ambulance chasing is organized"
and "the general population [of potential plaintiffs] is 'claim wise."' James Jr., supra note 71, at
552 n.7.
98. To be sure, the rise of specialists, by making the lawsuits more routine, may reduce the
disruptive effect of these suits on the rescuers.
99. Learned Hand famously wrote "After now some dozen years of experience [as a Judge]
I must say that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of
sickness or death." E.g., PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY P. O'CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE 131
(1997). Those who second Learned Hand's observation contradict themselves when they
simultaneously support the continued expansion of liability.
100. BASIL MARKESINIS, MICHAEL COESTER & GUIDO ALPA, COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL
INJURY IN ENGLISH, GERMAN AND ITALIAN LAW 215-17 (2005).
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3. Effect on the Power of Rescuers to Treat Potential Defendants Differently
Abolishing the fireman's rule, like most expansions of liability, empowers the
injured, here the injured professional rescuers, to sue for some injuries and not for
others and to sue some defendants and not others. This power to treat like-behaving
potential defendants differently may not concern us when the plaintiffs are private
persons who are not performing a public function. But professional rescuers are public
servants performing a vital public function. The public, rightly, may show greater
concern when professional rescuers do not treat like-behaving members of the public
equally. With the fireman's rule abolished, professional rescuers will sue certain
potential defendants whose negligence injured them but not others equally negligent
and whose negligence resulted in equal injury. Even when the rescuer's injury arises
from a single incident, the rescuer will have the power to choose among possible
defendants as long as each defendant's negligence was a cause of his injury.
When private persons are treated so differently, especially private persons who are
themselves victims of the peril, the public cannot help but wonder why. Why was one
victim of a fire which led to a professional rescuer being injured sued but not the
others, especially when all victims were equally negligent? Why did one incident in
which a rescuer was injured lead to suit, but not similar incidents? The fact that, at least
in regard to fires, more than half of all incidents can be attributed to some negligence
by some private person compounds the power of the rescuer to select among potential
defendants and heightens the appearance of unequal treatment. Did the rescuer let the
negligence of some private persons pass without suit because the person was a
celebrity, or because the person was "connected," or because the person offered a
bribe? Why did these professional rescuers sue one homeowner who negligently started
a kitchen fire but not another homeowner who just last year had been negligent in
exactly the same way, despite rescuers being injured in both incidents?' 0'
The decisions about whether and whom to sue will probably turn in part on the
judgment of the plaintiff's lawyer about such matters as a jury's likely perception of
the rescuer and of the potential defendant. The eagerness of the rescuer to sue will also
affect these decisions. But the public may conclude that these factors do not justify
public servants treating similar behavior so differently.
4. Effects on the Behavior of Professional Rescuers During Emergencies
The fireman's rule avoids any risk that the prospect of tort recovery will dilute the
rescuer's natural incentive to protect himself. That natural incentive operates when the
rescuer decides both on his self-protective precautions and on his activity level. For
example, a firefighter decides on a self-protective precaution when he decides whether
to wear a protective mask when entering a burning building. A firefighter decides on
his activity level when he decides whether to enter a burning building in the first place.
101. Richard Colbey, If You Save My Life, I Might Sue You, GuARDiAN (LONDON), Feb. 13,
1999, Money Page, at 17 ("Australian authorities[] announce[d] last month that they wanted
redress from former British soldier, Clive Sutton, who had to be rescued from an ill-advised
walking expedition in Papua New Guinea jungle. Interestingly, no such claim was intimated
after even more was spent by that country on fishing the equally deft solo yachtsman, Tony
Bullimore, out of the Indian Ocean in a blaze of publicity.")
[Vol. 82:745
A FRESH LOOK AT THE FIREMAN'S RULE
By denying liability, the rule rightly discourages rescue attempts when the expected
benefit from the attempt, for example, the expected value of the lives and property
saved if the fireman attempts the rescue discounted by the chance the rescue attempt
will fail, is swamped by the expected costs of the attempt, which includes the expected
injury cost to the rescuer and the expected damage to property. Plainly society prefers
that the rescuer refrain from such rash rescue attempts, despite the homage society pays
to rescuers injured in such attempts. To be sure, rescuers may lack the capacity in the
midst of an emergency to compare the expected costs and benefits of attempting rescue
with confidence. Still, the rashness of some rescue attempts will be obvious.
Abolishing the fireman's rule means incorporating the prospect of tort recovery into
the rescuer's on-the-spot decision making. It means dangling the possibility of a
windfall before all rescuers considering rash rescue attempts. Most rescuers doubtless
will ignore this possibility. But the risk of enticing some rescuers to undertake these
rash attempts should not be dismissed too summarily.
Because the professional rescuer arrives on the scene after any negligence by the
defendant, a rule that pressures the rescuer to opt for the optimum activity level is
desirable even when the defendant is clearly the cheaper precaution taker against the
peril. For example, although defendant's cost of avoiding the peril originally through
care (by putting out her cigarette, for example) or through a lower activity level (such
as not smoking) was trivial and much less than the cost of any self-protective measure
the rescuer could take at any stage, society prefers a rule that will pressure the rescuer
to consider whether his rescue attempt is rash. Were the care and activity level
decisions by the parties made simultaneously, the case for ruling against the cheaper
precaution taker of the peril would be stronger. But the sequential nature of the parties'
decisions calls for a rule that will preserve the rescuer's incentive not to risk himself
unduly once the peril has occurred, regardless of how cheaply defendant could have
avoided the peril in the first place. Although here this analysis favors the tort
defendant, the analysis is analogous to that which supported the pro-plaintiff last clear
chance doctrine, which was prominent when contributory negligence was a complete
defense. The last clear chance doctrine allowed plaintiffs to prevail despite their being
the cheaper precaution taker against their injury. The classic example is of a plaintiff
motorist whose contributory negligence led to his car being stranded on a train track
where it was later struck by a train whose employee saw the plaintiff on the track but
negligently failed to stop the train in time. Thanks to the doctrine, the plaintiff could
prevail against the defendant train despite the plaintiff's negligence and despite
plaintiff being the cheaper precaution taker against his injury. The last clear chance
rule was designed to induce optimal behavior from the party (the potential defendant)
with the last clear chance to avoid an injury to another (the potential plaintiff). The last
clear chance rule achieved this result by giving the defendant incentive to take care
despite defendant's knowledge of the earlier contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
Absent the last clear chance rule, the defendant's knowledge ofthe earlier contributory
negligence of the plaintiff would have assured the defendant that she could be careless
toward the plaintiff with impunity, for the plaintiff's earlier negligence protected the
defendant from any chance of being held liable for the plaintiff's injuries.
This point illustrates that the law should not be content merely to maintain proper
incentives for the professional rescuer to perform the rescue with care. Retaining the
defense of contributory negligence would suffice for that purpose, even if the fireman's
rule was abolished. The law also wants to maintain proper incentive for a professional
rescuer to refrain from undesirable rescue attempts. Only a rule of no liability on
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defendant, such as the fireman's rule, serves that purpose. Merely retaining a
contributory negligence defense, which focuses only on how the rescue attempt was
performed and which allows those undertaking rash rescue attempts to recover, does
not. This is just another way of saying that the law should be concerned with incentives
for optimum levels of activity as well as with incentives for optimal levels of care. 
102
Too much should not be made of the rule's tendency to increase the care that
professional rescuers take for themselves. The rescuer's instinct for self-preservation
will remain a powerful incentive to protect himself even if the fireman's rule is
abolished. The rescuer's training in self-protection, his habits, and the preference most
rescuers would give to their health over the prospect of a tort recovery reinforce that
instinct for self-preservation. One suspects abolishing the rule would tempt only a few
rescuers to endanger themselves rashly.
The most disturbing effect of abolishing the rule on the professional rescuer's
behavior springs from the distorted incentive it gives rescuers to undertake rescues for
some more than for others. Without the rule, professional rescuers may become more
willing to risk injury when prospects for a tort recovery are promising. While this
suggestion may sound preposterous, or even insulting to the noble image of rescuers,
the fireman's rule may have promoted that image. Consider what a firefighter, for
example, may eventually learn if the fireman's rule is abolished and successful suits by
firefighters no longer elicit surprise. The firefighter may soon learn that more than half
of all rescue calls can be traced to some negligence by some possible defendant,'0 3 that
the collateral source rule and related rules104 mean that a successful tort action offers
him the prospect of a financial windfall, and that his lawyers and union representatives
have learned how to bring these actions in a manner that is not too disruptive and
costly to his comrades and himself. Is it preposterous to think a firefighter so alerted
may consider the possibility of a tort recovery when he deals with a particular call?
Abolishing the fireman's rule tempts a firefighter to risk injury more when, for
instance, the residents or owners of the burning building are likely to have substantial
liability insurance. Fires threatening expensive homes may elicit, or (nearly as
undesirably) appear to elicit, greater rescue efforts than fires threatening less expensive
homes. Fires threatening commercial buildings, where levels of liability insurance are
typically higher, may elicit greater rescue efforts than those threatening homes. Of
course, any doubts the firefighter harbors at the time he acts about the extent of
defendant's liability insurance or financial responsibility should mitigate his temptation
to behave differently. But many emergency calls, merely by indicating the
neighborhood of the peril or the person or type of structure endangered, will signal the
102. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW, 92-93, 141-42 (1987) (emphasizing the role of liability rules in establishing incentive for
optimal activity levels). But see GEORGE L. PRIEST, MODERN TORT LAW AND ITS REFORM 47
(1987) (the effect of liability on activity levels is "trivial"). Of course if one assumes
professional rescuers as a rule undervalue the expected benefit from attempting the rescue-
compared to the actual social benefit-or overvalue the expected cost of injury to themselves,
then one might opt for a rule that would regularly subsidize rescue attempts. The prospect of a
tort recovery could serve as that subsidy.
103. See supra text accompanying note 90.
104. See, e.g., Nunez v. Palmer 902 A.2d 660, 663 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (reaffirming the
collateral source rule); Leitinger v. Van Buren Mgmt., Inc., 720 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2006) (also upholding the collateral source rule).
[Vol. 82:745
A FRESH LOOK AT THE FIREMAN'S RULE
rescuer at once that those who negligently triggered the peril will lack funds or
insurance to pay a tort judgment.
As these tort recoveries by rescuers become more common, and more widely seen
to give injured rescuers a windfall, the poor may begin to suspect rescuers ofproviding
less aggressive rescue services to them than to the financially responsible even if no
difference in fact exists. Indeed there is evidence that the poor already believe they
receive inferior treatment at the hands of professional rescuers compared to the more
affluent. 1
05
Arguably courts should avoid creating any incentive structure for rescuers that is
even conceptually inconsistent with the ideal of equal service to all or with the
rescuer's stated mission. The fireman's rule-by eliminating the distraction of a
possible tort recovery-creates incentive for these rescuers to give their single-minded
attention to their stated mission.
0 6
5. Effect on Public Investigations of Emergencies
Abolishing the fireman's rule may also affect the subsequent investigation into the
peril in response to which the rescuers were injured. With the fireman's rule, the fire
investigation squad, for example, is encouraged to conduct a largely untrammeled
investigation of the cause of the fire, an investigation which focuses on ascertaining the
fire's cause for future preventive purposes. To be sure, the fire investigators have
reason to gather and preserve evidence of arson. But once arson is ruled out, the
investigators have little reason to care whether the fire arose from the negligence of
some financially responsible private party or whether injured firefighters were causally
negligent in failing to protect themselves. Under the fireman's rule, there is little
pressure on the investigators to reach any particular findings on these matters. Much
the same is also true for investigation of police perils.
Abolishing the fireman's rule, in contrast, heightens the importance of gathering and
preserving evidence on all the elements and defenses to the rescuer's possible tort
action. 10 7 What had been of interest primarily to the fire investigation squad will
105. See Confidence in the Police, http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/html/just/features/
0500_01/policeopinion.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
106. For firemen that mission is first, to stop the spread of fires, and second, to minimize the
damage to life, health and property from the fire. See, e.g., AboutIFD, http://www.
indygov.org/eGov/City/DPS/IFD/About/home.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2007); Mission
Statement of the Los Angeles Fire Department, http://www.lafd.org/mission.htm (last visited
Apr. 2, 2007). For police, that mission is to enforce the law and protect the innocent. See, e.g.,
About NYPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/mission.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007);
Mission Statement of the LAPD, http://www.lapdonline.org/searchresults/content-basic-view/
844844 (last visited Apr. 2, 2007). For emergency medical technicians, that mission is to
stabilize pre-hospital emergencies and transport the ill and injured safely and expeditiously to
the appropriate medical facility. See, Austin/Travis County Emergency Medical Services,
http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/ems/mission.htm (last visited Apr. 2,2007). For the Coast Guard, that
mission is to minimize the loss of life, injury, and property in the maritime environment.
107. This includes evidence of any of the following: negligence by the defendant crime
victim or occupant, the cause-in-fact and proximate cause connection between that negligence
and the rescuer's injury, the rescuer's contributory negligence, and the cause-in-fact and
proximate cause connection between that contributory negligence and the rescuer's injury.
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become of interest to the rescuers, their brother officers, potential defendants, and any
investigators they may employ. Gathering, organizing, and storing this evidence carries
its own costs in more repositories, more staff, less time for the staff's other duties, and
a general hindering of the effort to finish the investigation of the peril and move on.
As mentioned above, abolishing the fireman's rule also threatens the integrity of the
investigation because of the increased pressure on investigators to support their brother
rescuer's tort suit. While an investigator may strive to be independent, a brother officer
is likely much closer to him than is the defendant crime victim or home or business
owner, typically a stranger with no relationship whatsoever to the investigator. To
some extent, fire investigators now encounter similar pressure from prosecutors to find
evidence supporting criminal prosecutions for arson. But the pressure to find evidence
of arson is eventually offset, at least somewhat, by the prosecution's need to prove
arson beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing similar offsets the pressure in the brother
rescuer's tort case to find evidence of the defendant's causal negligence. The brother
rescuer's personal stake in his tort case may be so significant that investigators feel
obligated, even without any communication, to look for evidence favorable to the
rescuer. In light of this unequal pressure on the public investigator, the statutes that
exist in every state to give the public investigator greater and earlier access to the
emergency scene than any investigator of the tort defendant' 0 8 conflict with civil
procedure norms that call for allowing each party in a tort suit roughly equal access to
the critical evidence. Indeed the great advantage the public investigator now
understandably enjoys suggests the plaintiff rescuer will be able to gather favorable
evidence much more easily than the private defendant.
The possible effects of abolishing the fireman's rule on the rescuer's behavior
during the peril and on the peril's investigation seem disturbingly negative. The only
positive effect-if it is positive-is that the prospect of tort recovery will further
encourage rescuers to risk their lives and physical well-being to save the life and
property of the victims of the peril. Whether that effect is in fact positive will depend
on one's view of the willingness of professional rescuers to take these risks now when
most jurisdictions still embrace the fireman's rule. There is some evidence that the
public approves and would not change what it believes to be the current willingness of
professional rescuers to take these risks. 109
6. Other Effects on the Careers of Professional Rescuers
Abolishing the fireman's rule may also affect the job-related behavior of rescuers by
increasing, at least in the short term, the variance and amount of the rescuers' total
compensation." 0 The professional rescuers' total compensation will increase simply
108. See ALA. CODE § 36-19-4 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 27-32.1 (2004).
109. See Confidence in the Police, supra note 105.
110. Economic theory suggests this increase should eventually be reflected in lower money
wages or less generous first-party benefits as would be the case when any fringe benefit is
increased. But econometric studies yield varying answers about whether an increase in post-
injury compensation results in reduced wages. See generally PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN E.
KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION 48-49
(2000). The increased income, at least until that increase is offset by lower wages, should attract
higher quality applicants.
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because subrogation by the rescuer's first-party insurers is sure to be incomplete. I '
Granted, the prospect of tort recovery amounts to a highly irregular and unpredictable
compensation increase , which of course will accrue only to a fraction of injured
rescuers and their heirs. This irregularity and unpredictability justifies comparing the
prospect of tort recovery to a lottery ticket, albeit the prospect of tort recovery where
none existed before more resembles giving the rescuers a free lottery ticket than
offering the rescuers a lottery ticket for a price.' 12 Importing the unpredictability and
irregularity of tort recovery into work which was notable for offering predictable and
regular compensation may affect professional rescuers in a number of ways.
According to economic theory, the new prospect of tort recovery should attract
more recruits away from other careers and inspire current rescuers to work longer,
increasing the average number of years these trained professionals stay on the job.
While that is likely to be the dominant effect, those rescuers who are successful as tort
plaintiffs may react differently. They may be more inclined to take their chances with
self-employment or to opt for earlier retirement or for work that poses less risk of
physical injury.' 13
Similarly, the prospect of tort recovery should alter at the margin the type of person
attracted away from other pursuits into professional rescuing. Professional rescuing
will appear more attractive to the claim-prone-that is, those who, for any number of
reasons, are most likely to sue. The lottery-like aspect of tort liability should also
increase this work's appeal to those whose attitude toward financial risk attracts them
to lotteries.
This change in the type of persons who apply to be rescuers may become more
conspicuous if the prospect of tort recovery alters the public recognition accorded
professional rescuers. At present public recognition of these rescuers is exceptional as
the adjectives frequently applied to rescuers-heroic and unselfish--suggest. The
public esteem and glory add to the financial attraction of the work. But the publicized
specter of rescuers successfully suing the private parties responsible for the peril, most
111. See, e.g., Diane Williamson, Obscure Rule Lets Police Double Dip, SUNDAY TELEGRAM
(Worcester, Mass.), Nov. 29, 1998, at B1.
112. See ATIYAH, supra note 50, at 5. Deborah Hensler has compared the asbestos litigation
to a lottery:
Results ofjury verdicts are capricious and uncertain. Sick people and people who
have died a terrible death from asbestos are being turned away from the courts,
while people with minimal injuries who may never suffer severe asbestos disease
are being awarded hundreds of thousands of dollars, and even in excess of a
million dollars. The asbestos litigation often resembles the casinos sixty miles east
of Philadelphia more than a courtroom procedure.
DEBORAH R. HENSLER, WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, MOLLY SELVIN & PATRICIA A. EBENER,
ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS 41 (1985) (emphasis in
original).
113. The substitution away from other vocations may be less than if the expected value of the
tort recovery took the form of a wage increase. People may undervalue the prospect of tort
recovery compared to a wage increase. One reason may be that a non-pecuniary loss, such as the
pain and suffering from an injury, does not increase their marginal utility for money. Hence they
have little reason to purchase insurance against that loss and will not value compensation for
that loss as highly as they would value compensation for, say, the loss of a bread-winner. See
George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 237
(1992); ATIYAH, supra note 50, at 114.
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of whom the rescuers came to aid, may compromise that public esteem. The public
may look at the police in a different way once their proud mandate "to protect and
serve" begins to resemble "to protect and sue."' 14 Much of the public may be shocked
to learn that almost all of the rescuer's tort recovery comes on top of the first-party
benefits that the taxpayer already provided. Allowing the rescuer to recover tort
damages for his lost income and medical expenses when, thanks to the combined effect
of the rescuer's first-party benefits and the collateral source rule, the rescuer did not
lose any income or bear any medical expenses may strike the public as ingenuous. To
the public, the formerly virtuous rescuers may now seem grasping. Abolishing the
fireman's rule, therefore, threatens today's esteem for professional rescuers. If the
public starts to look at injured rescuers with ajaundiced eye, then this career will tend
to attract applicants who prefer the increased chance to sue over the diminished public
recognition-hardly a desirable demographic.
Seeing a few of their colleagues pocket a tort recovery for injuries identical to those
for which other professional rescuers are limited to first-party benefits may also impair
morale on the job. The importance of minimizing envy and resentment is particularly
keen in a vocation where teamwork, esprit de corps, and a willingness to risk injury to
help fellow officers play such a large role in the success of the rescuers' mission.
115
Encouraging injured professional rescuers to "name, blame, claim"' 16 against the
potential defendants will leave many rescuers conflicted. Becoming an "action-taking
knave"1 7 against the endangered and suffering will seem to some rescuers contrary to
their oath. The attempt to enrich themselves by displaying their disabled condition to
sympathetic juries may strike professional rescuers as dishonorable. The prospect of a
windfall for being injured may also reduce their intrinsic motivation.
Suing may tarnish the rescuer's image of his work as a noble mission and lower his
self-esteem. The invitation to sue may also affect the rescuer's view of his injury and
his recovery. The fireman's rule encourages an injured rescuer to view his injury as a
scar earned in a noble battle on behalf of the public against crime or natural danger, a
view likely to promote his recovery. Abolition of the fireman's rule encourages the
injured rescuer to turn against the defendants, to cultivate his disappointment about his
injury, and to channel that disappointment into blaming the defendants and assigning to
them the responsibility for his injuries. Through the process of suing, the injured
rescuer tends to undergo a transformation from seeing himself as defendant's savior
into seeing himself as defendant's victim. The process of suing tends to turn his
114. Professor Dauber argues that the receipt of aid beyond one's first-party benefits changes
the public perception of a person from that of a virtuous victim to that of an untrustworthy
supplicant. Michele L. Dauber, The War of 1812, Sept. 11, and the Politics of Compensation, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 289,337 (2003).
115. See Richland Center Police Department, http://www.ci.richland-center.wi.us/police.htm
(last visited Apr. 2, 2007) (listing teamwork as part of the Richland Center, Wisconsin Police
Department's mission statement); John M. Violanti, Residuals of Police Occupational Trauma
(1997), http://www.massey.ac.nz/-trauma/issues/1997-3/violantl .htm (describing teamwork for
police as necessary for survival against the enemy).
116. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 631
(1981); Austin Sarat, Imagining the Law of the Father: Loss, Dread, and Mourning in The
Sweet Hereafter, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 3 (2000).
117. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 2, sc. 2.
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injuries from a warrior's badge of honor into the grievance of a supplicant. Does
society want to encourage professional rescuers to feel so aggrieved?
To be sure, some rescuers may derive satisfaction from the belief that their suits,
with the attendant publicity, focus public attention on the dangers of defendant's
negligence. This satisfaction from raising the public's consciousness may bolster the
rescuer's self-esteem. Empowering the professional rescuer with the option to sue may
bolster his self-esteem indirectly as well. The professional rescuer who views his work
as a noble mission of service to the public, wholly inconsistent with suing the public's
careless members, will then be able to express that view by scorning his option to sue.
In refusing to sue the defendants he strove to aid, he gains the satisfaction Portia in
Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice expressed in rejecting Antonio's offer to
compensate her for her assistance: "He is well paid who is well satisfied; and I
delivering you / am satisfied and therein do account myself well paid." ' 1 8 Alas, giving
rescuers the option to sue foments dissension in the squad because those who refuse to
sue may thereby appear to be judging critically those who sue.
The prospect of tort recovery creates a perverse incentive for professional rescuers
to exaggerate their injuries and to malinger.' 19 With the fireman's rule abolished, the
stalwart who takes pride in minimizing his injuries by recovering quickly and returning
to work or by working despite his injury will look a bit more foolish. To be sure, the
current first-party benefits create similar undesirable incentives. But such self-seeking
abuse of first-party benefits is constrained, at least somewhat, through an informal web
of incentives regarding promotion and job assignment' 20 that take account of the
rescuer's record of claiming benefits. Abuse of first-party benefits is also constrained
through building solidarity and brotherly spirit among the squad. These constraints on
overclaiming will not exist in the professional rescuer's tort case against the negligent
strangers who can be sued once the fireman's rule is abolished. A RAND Institute
study showed the effect of the prospect of tort recovery on the tendency of those
injured in car accidents to visit doctors for treatment of "soft injuries," such as the
injury to soft tissues from whiplash.121 In states like New York and Michigan where the
no-fault statutes covered such visits but did not allow recovery in soft tissue cases for
general damages such as pain and suffering, only seven doctor visits for soft injuries
118. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
119. ORIN KLAMER & RICHARD BREFFALT, WORKER'S COMPENSATION: SHARING THE SOCIAL
COMPACT 37 (2001) ("By emphasizing recovery for, rather than recovery from, their injury,
litigation leads workers to dwell on their injuries, slowing down their return to work and
delaying commencement of vocational rehabilitation .... No one gets well while his claim is
pending.")
120. E.g., City of Lawton, Okla. Administrative Policy 3-21, Light (Limited) Duty Following
an On the Job Injury (May 2, 2005), available at http://www.cityof.lawton.ok.us/CityCode/
AdministrativePolicies/Section_3/21.html (police or firefighters who because of injury spend
more than a specified number of hours on light duty are not assured of returning to their former
position); Interview with Bill Johnson, Director of National Police Officers Association,
September 18, 2006, (officers suspected of milking insurance benefits by falsely claiming injury
or sickness are not likely to be promoted); Interview with Detective Christopher Armstrong, San
Diego Police Department, September 19, 2006, (police on light duty because of injury are
ineligible for promotion or transfer).
121. STEPHEN J. CARROLL, ALLAN F. ABRAHAMSE & MARY E. VAIANA, THE COSTS OF ExCESS
MEDICAL CLAIMS FOR AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURIES 12 (1995).
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were made for every ten visits for hard injuries. In California, where all injury claims
were handled by the tort system, and thus the injured could increase their general
damages by "building up their specials" through more doctor visits for soft injuries,
twenty-five visits for soft injuries were claimed for every ten visits for hard injuries.
The authors concluded that in 1988 these excess medical visits and claims for soft
injuries added almost $150 to the liability insurance premiums of the average driver in
a tort state. Should society encourage police and firefighters to take advantage of a tort
system that so rewards them for magnifying their injuries? Should society remain
indifferent to the specter of lawyers telling professional rescuers that the more
miserable, depressed, and incapable of getting back to work they claim to be, and the
more they visit doctors and psychiatrists, the more damages they are likely to
recover? 122
Once these lawsuits become a recognized feature of their work, professional
rescuers collectively may respond with measures to mitigate some of the lawsuits'
undesirable effects on morale and on the irregularity of the rescuer's compensation.
For instance, rescuers' unions may feel that spreading tort recoveries among all the
rescuers who suffer injuries similar to those of the successful tort plaintiff would
reduce envy and resentment and improve esprit de corps. Creating a fund of tort
recoveries and dispersing the fund among all rescuers, or at least all similarly injured
rescuers, at regular intervals during the year would also even out and render more
predictable the rescuer's compensation. Whether unions or other representatives of
rescuers will be able to induce successful plaintiffs to donate their tort recovery in
whole or in part for this purpose is uncertain. Union provisions that would compel
successful plaintiffs to share their recoveries in this manner may be unenforceable.
After all, in the eyes of tort law, the rescuer's first-party benefits are all ignored. In the
eyes of tort law, the rescuer's tort recovery, rather than creating any windfall that
should be shared with his brother officers, merely makes the rescuer whole.
7. Concerns of Retributive Justice
As discussed earlier, there is no serious case for abolishing the fireman's rule on the
ground of corrective justice. 123 But the goal of retributive justice calls for sanctioning
the culpable defendant regardless of whether the plaintiff experiences defendant's
behavior as a wrong to him. One of the most conspicuous shortcomings of the
fireman's rule is that it fails to sanction behavior by defendant crime victims or a home
or business owner which creates an unreasonable risk of a peril that endangers
responding professional rescuers. As defendant's negligence becomes more culpable,
the harm to a professional rescuer from her behavior more foreseeable, and the other
sanctions for defendant's behavior fewer and less significant, the fireman's rule more
offends tort law's goal of sanctioning culpable wrongdoers. But negligence has become
such a weak concept in modem tort law that much behavior deemed negligent will not
122. The effect of suing the public on the professional rescuer's mental health is unclear.
Presumably, a professional rescuer, thanks to his training and experience, suffers less dread than
the usual plaintiff from reliving his injury over and over as litigation requires. Litigation may
nevertheless prevent a professional rescuer from "letting go" of his injury, thus delaying him
from completing his mourning about his injury.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
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be viewed as culpable to any significant extent, even by plaintiffs. 124 Fires and crimes
to which professional rescuers are eventually summoned can be triggered by a moment
of inadvertence while cooking or while closing up a home or business for the evening.
Harmless fires can be turned into perils by a defendant forgetting to change the
batteries on his smoke alarm. While such momentary inadvertence routinely is viewed
as negligence, few would claim it implicates the concerns of retributive justice.
25
When the negligence is committed not by the defendant business owner personally but
merely by an employee for whom defendant is vicariously liable, concerns of
retributive justice do not enter the picture. Behavior by defendant more egregious than
ordinary negligence, after all, can be attacked by injured rescuers despite the fireman's
rule.
The notion that imposing tort liability in proportion to the tortfeasor's wrongdoing
will achieve retributive justice is undermined by the fact that tort liability is, as a
practical matter, only imposed on those with insurance or those who are otherwise
financially responsible. Judgment-proof crime victims, renters, homeowners, and
occupants of business premises escape liability to professional rescuers however badly
they behave. Tort law in practice accords sharply disparate treatment to persons who
have behaved with equal culpability, dumping liability on the financially responsible
and allowing the negligence of the judgment proof to pass without sanction. Tort
liability in practice only threatens the financially responsible; to them alone the norms
of tort law are meaningful. Abolishing the fireman's rule means extending this
discriminatory character of tort liability into another domain of human activity. Why
this discriminatory character of tort liability has not sapped the enthusiasm for
expanding liability among those who emphasize retributive justice remains a mystery-
a mystery that some observers explain by citing the financial gain from liability to the
legal profession. 
126
8. Deterring Defendants' Negligence
The worst utilitarian drawback of the fireman's rule stems from the rule's failure to
deter potential defendants from the negligence that triggered the peril.1 27 The rule
externalizes from these potential defendants the loss to responding professional
rescuers. By allowing potential defendants to ignore the risk to responding rescuers, the
fireman's rule invites them to underestimate the total expected loss from a peril.
Abolishing the fireman's rule would likely inspire certain types of cost-justified
precautions by crime victims and by home and business owners more than others. The
124. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modem
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601,623 n. 104 (1992) (noting how the notion of negligence
has weakened from its pre- 1960 meaning of "clear moral culpability substantially antagonistic to
social norms").
125. Professor Atiyah sees nothing objectionable about letting such negligence go
unpunished or even uncorrected. ATIYAH, supra note 50, at 57.
126. Cf WALTER OLSEN, THE RULE OF LAWYERS 211 (2004) (noting the connection between
the amount of liability and the wealth of attorneys).
127. An enormous and continually expanding literature deals with the extent to which tort
liability actually deters negligence. E.g., G. EADs & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS:
CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 39 (1983). Even a
summary review of this literature is outside the scope of this Article.
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threat of liability is not so likely to inspire potential defendants to take spur-of-the-
moment precautions like putting out a cigarette carefully before sleeping. The threat is
more likely to inspire durable precautions that are taken or not taken only after
reflection. For example, there may be durable precautions which a homeowner
designing her home should take against fire that would not be taken, because not
viewed by the homeowner as cost-justified, when the risk to the responding rescuers is
ignored. Every decision by the homeowner designing her home, from the relative
location of rooms to the flammability of the wallpaper selected, to the installation of
high quality fire alarms, might change once the safety of professional rescuers is
considered. Likewise, potential crime victims would be more likely to buy a home
security system, fence, or personal firearm when negligently becoming a crime victim
carries with it the possibility of liability to the police who are injured in responding to
the crime. 128 In time, the liability risk to the potential defendants should influence their
choice of suppliers. Builders and trade associations of builders, for example, who
establish the standards for safe construction, may now insufficiently appreciate the
effect of their standards on responding rescuers because their customers give them no
financial reason to care about the rescuers. Consequently, the standards they
promulgate may not incorporate all the precautions that would be cost-justified if the
safety of responding rescuers was fully considered. Abolishing the fireman's rule
should alert potential defendants and those with whom they deal to the risk to rescuers
and should more closely align the private and social costs of the peril.
A number of considerations mitigate this drawback of the fireman's rule. First,
representatives of police and firefighters have long acted to further the safety of
rescuers. Their influence has led the National Fire Protection Association to develop
standards for construction that are designed specifically to improve the safety of
firefighters. The U.S. Department of Labor, through the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, has likewise promulgated various rules for the safety of
firefighters. 29 Statutory regulations also aim to protect rescuers. Statutes requiring
sprinkler systems and prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons provide examples.
These regulations reduce the need for, and the safety gain from, relying on tort liability
to inspire precautions for professional rescuers.
3 0
Second, the number of additional precautions elicited from potential defendants by
imposing tort liability is likely to be modest. Because injuries to rescuers for which the
potential defendant's liability insurer must pay will be sporadic from the insurer's point
of view, because a potential defendant's past liability to rescuers does not predict her
future liability, and because most potential defendants are not large enough to merit
individualized attention from the insurer, liability insurers are not likely to refine their
risk classifications through experience, feature, or activity rating of potential
defendants.' 31 Liability insurers who offer flat rate policies and no safety advice will
128. Some precautions that jurors or liability insurers insist upon may carry disadvantages
that jurors or liability insurers do not fully appreciate. For example, carrying a firearm may
increase the risk of accidental injury; dismantling fireplaces because of their risk to firefighters
may impair aesthetics.
129. CLARK, supra note 62, at 172.
130. To be sure, regulations are likely to render unnecessary the deterrent value of tort
liability only when and if injuries to professional rescuers become a salient public concern.
131. Unlike first-party fire and property insurers and liability insurers for car owners,
liability insurers for homeowners rarely experience rate. Nor do liability insurers for
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exert little pressure on potential defendants to take extra precautions. Because the
potential defendants who negligently fail to take precautions for the safety of rescuers
will pay the same premium as those who take those precautions, liability simply results
in the safe potential defendants subsidizing the unsafe. As Professor Abraham has said:
If a form of coverage uses little classification or is not sensitive to changes in
claims experience through experience rating, the degree of control [over
precaution taking] that might in the abstract be exercised by [insurers] who have
that coverage is not very relevant .... At best [the extra liability] will affect the
level of the activity engaged in, but not the safety of the activity itself.3 2
For a homeowner, a decreased activity level-because of the additional liability and
the resulting higher liability insurance premiums-would typically take the form of
refraining from buying a home. But because the cost of the added premiums is trivial in
comparison to the other costs of buying a home, the added liability and liability
premiums may not change the homeowner's behavior at all.1
33
A defendant's possession of a flat rate liability insurance policy that will not be
cancelled does not render her indifferent about her tort liability, however. The
defendant must still concern herself with the possibility that a jury award against her
will exceed the limits of her liability coverage. But this danger is not as great as a
simple comparison of the limits of his liability coverage with the amount of current
jury awards would suggest. First, insurance law principles eliminate this danger
whenever the plaintiff can be induced to accept a settlement offer within the limits of
the defendant's liability coverage.' 34 Second, there exists a well-entrenched, if
unspoken, custom among the plaintiffs' bar against seeking to collect-at least from
homeowners feature rate (based on the presence of dangerous features in the home), activity rate
(based on the range of activities in the home), or schedule rate (based on the results of
inspections or surveys). The resulting "flatness" of the homeowner defendants' premiums
arguably prevents any possible deterrence from tort liability. In contrast, insurers of businesses
do engage in schedule rating. See STEvE P. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY
LAW 17 (1989); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Liability Insurance, 75
CORNELL L. REv. 313, 320 (1991). The failure of so much liability insurance to rate, either by
experience, features, activities, or schedules reflects the long-standing indifference of the
liability insurance industry to accident prevention. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability Insurance
and Accident Prevention: The Evolution of an Idea, 64 MD. L. REv. 573, 576-608 (2005)
(describing the history of this indifference).
The existence of the fireman's rule, by eliminating any fear that their insureds will be liable
to professional rescuers, may contribute to liability insurers' failure to rate their insureds and to
their failure to insist on their insureds taking precautions for the safety of rescuers.
132. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 139 (1986).
133. As a practical matter, most home and business owners will lack the option of dropping
their liability insurance because their lenders will require them-as a condition of continuing the
loan-to retain their property and fire insurance, and the standardized property and fire
insurance policies include liability coverage.
134. Liability insurers must either accept such a settlement, which should save the defendant
from having to pay, or be liable for a judgment in excess of the policy limits-a result that also
saves the defendant from having to pay. Cresci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967);
see also Doe v. S.C. Med. Malpractice Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 557 S.E.2d 670 (S.C.
2001).
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individual defendants--"blood money," that is, money beyond the defendant's liability
insurance limits. 135
Potential defendants have other incentives to take cost-justified precautions to avoid
the peril besides the fear of tort liability to possible rescuers. As mentioned earlier,
their instinct to preserve themselves, their family, their possessions, and their
businesses provides powerful incentives to avoid the peril. While the self-preservation
instinct ought as well to deter negligence by car drivers, there is empirical evidence
that imposing liability for negligent driving leads to perceptibly less negligent
driving.136 No such empirical evidence exists of a comparable safety payoff from
imposing liability in our context. 137
The fireman's rule is not the only factor reducing defendants' incentive to take
precautions against these perils. Defendants' possession of first-party property and
health insurance against some of their own losses from these perils also reduces the
defendants' incentive to take precautions. But first-party property insurers have long
combated the extra risks created by this moral hazard through such measures as
deductibles, coinsurance provisions, and coverage only for the depreciated value of the
property without regard to the associational or sentimental values. These measures
contain the tendency of first-party insurance to reduce the home or business owner's
incentive to take precautions.
This Article does not attempt to add to the enormous literature on the deterrent
value of tort liability except to express doubt about the assumption that the amount of
damages juries award in cases of personal injury-as opposed to cases of mere
property loss-provides the most accurate measure of the social cost of the injury, and
hence, that making defendant pay that amount provides optimal deterrence. Along with
Gary Schwartz, I reject the notion that tort damage awards better measure social injury
costs, and thereby provide more appropriate incentives for safety, than lesser estimates
of injury costs, such as worker's compensation awards. 38
135. Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action,
35 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 275 (2001) (describing the custom of not seeking "blood money" except
from large businesses that self-insure).
136. See supra text accompanying note 19. There are other contexts where tort liability for
negligence is warranted on deterrence grounds, even though the instinct for self-preservation
ought to induce defendant to take all cost-justified precautions. An example would be airline
liability for the negligence of the airline's pilot that led to an air crash. While the pilot's instinct
for self-preservation ought to induce him to be careful, the severity of such crashes and the
importance of the airline taking appropriate care in selecting, training, and disciplining their
pilots warrants liability.
137. Arguably, the most conspicuous example of negligently endangering professional
rescuers in the modem era was the decision of so many residents of New Orleans to ignore
orders to evacuate before Hurricane Katrina struck. Foreseeably, their failure to evacuate put in
grave danger the legions of professional, and amateur, rescuers who would respond to their
plight. Were the fireman's rule abolished, and the residents aware of their liability to injured
rescuers, is it likely that the threat of that liability would have increased the number of residents
who heeded the order to evacuate? Through such questions, asked context by context, a court
may be able to render a common sense judgment of the deterrent value of liability for negligence
in the context before it, even when the deterrent value of such liability more generally is
indeterminate.
138. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 392 (1994) ("From an economic perspective, it is unclear
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Finally, those who emphasize the beneficial incentives for precaution taking from
imposing tort liability for negligence must concede that the incentives will elicit no
extra precautions from potential defendants who are judgment-proof. No expansion of
liability will change the behavior of those who know their lack of liability insurance or
financial responsibility renders the sanctions of tort law irrelevant to them. Perhaps
because nothing can be done about the substantial percentage of possible defendants
who are judgment proof, commentators have tended to ignore tort liability's failure to
elicit precautions from those defendants and the resulting unequal application of the
tort weapon in action. A torts system that treats some of those who have behaved with
equal culpability far more harshly than it treats others is, for that reason, a flawed
system. And this flaw, far from being irrelevant, argues strongly against expanding that
system. A criminal law that discriminates so grossly in its application based on wealth
and the presence of liability insurance would have long since been deemed to violate
the equal protection clause. Whatever the other merits of that law, however socially
undesirable the behavior it proscribes, a consensus would proclaim "better no law than
one that cuts so unevenly."
9. Discouraging Defendants from Summoning Professional Rescuers
While the fireman's rule fails to encourage a potential defendant to take precautions
to avoid these perils altogether, the rule encourages desirable behavior from her once
the peril is discovered. For the rule sends the message, loudly and clearly, to a potential
defendant and to anyone acting on her behalf: "Summon the professional rescuers at
once!"1 39 Abolishing the rule, in contrast, invites a potential defendant--especially one
wealthy enough to be worth suing but who lacks liability insurance coverage 14° to
deal with the peril so as to avoid any liability risk to rescuers. Abolishing the rule
whether a tort system or workers compensation provides better incentives for workplace
safety .. "); see also James R. Chelius, The Influence of Workers' Compensation on Safety
Incentives, 35 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 235 (1982). It is arbitrary to award damages for the
plaintiff's pain and suffering but not for, say, the plaintiffs inconvenience, interrupted plans,
lost opportunities, boredom, harm to reputation, and embarrassment. Tort awards may overstate
the costs of injury to the plaintiff because they ignore the taxes the plaintiff would have needed
to pay on awards for lost income, the benefits the plaintiff receives from not having to work to
obtain that income, the plaintiff's ancillary costs of earning that income, the possibility that
other events would have prevented plaintiff from earning that income or from enjoying the lost
pleasures for which pain and suffering damages are awarded, the plaintiffs ability to adjust to
his injury, and the (admittedly less than 50%) chance that plaintiff's injury would have occurred
even if defendant has not been negligent. Arguably an accounting of the net social costs of a
personal injury should also consider the benefits from plaintiffs injury to plaintiffs rivals in
every domain from business to romance.
The tort scholars who assume, usually without discussion, that tort damage awards provide
the most accurate measure of social injury costs for deterrence purposes are legion. See, e.g.,
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNoMIcs (3d ed. 2000); A. MITCHELL POUNSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcoNoMIcs (1983); George L. Priest, The Problematic Structure
of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 527 (2003).
139. See Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 356 (Cal. 1994) ("[T]he public
good is best served by a quick response to [emergencies] without questions asked as to the cause
of the [emergency] ....").
140. Wealthy renters without liability insurance are one example of those who might be
tempted to delay summoning rescuers because of their fear of being liable to injured rescuers..
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encourages a potential defendant fearful of a tort claim against her to delay calling the
professional rescuer on the chance that the potential defendant, or her employees, will
successfully deal with the peril themselves.141 Professor Prosser deemed preposterous
the possibility that a potential defendant would hesitate to summon professional
rescuers in the absence of the rule. 42 But he seems to have ignored that employees
trained to deal with such perils will be barred by the workers' compensation laws from
suing their employer for any injury and consequently they will become-in the view of
their business employer-the preferred rescuers. 143 Hence once a fire has started at
such a business, for example, it is not preposterous to think that fear of liability to the
firefighters may lead the business to delay calling the professionals in the hope that its
employees-the preferred firefighters--can deal with the fire. Abolishing the fireman's
rule, therefore, sends a potential defendant who discovers a peril the message: "First,
see if your employees can handle it."'144
While this message may serve the interests of potential defendants, it offends the
interest of society. Defendants and their employees may overestimate their relative
competence to deal with the peril compared to the professionals. Moreover, the
incentives facing current professional rescuers coincide much more with society's
wishes. The top priority of firefighters, for example, is to contain the fire. Only when
that priority is met do firefighters turn to the secondary priority of reducing the damage
to the structure set afire. Society's wish to mitigate the overall social loss from a fire
calls for these priorities. But defendant's employees, or the firms the defendant
contracts with, are likely to reverse those priorities. Even if defendant instructs its
employees or contractors to adopt the socially desired priorities (e.g., "contain the fire
before reducing the damage to what has been set afire"), one cannot realistically expect
employees or contractors to have the same whole-hearted commitment to society's
wishes as firefighters and policemen are trained to have. 145 As a result, the damage
141. Abolishing the rule also encourages potential defendants to urge rescuers who have
reached the scene not to endanger themselves. In an extreme case, it could lead panicking
potential defendants to impede rescuers who are about to endanger themselves.
142. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 431 (W. Page Keeton, ed., 5th ed. 1984 &
Supp. 1988).
143. In Connecticut, where the fireman's rule has been virtually abolished, a defendant who
suffered a heart attack was sued by an emergency medical technician who slipped on
defendant's steps while moving defendant into an ambulance. After years of dealing with the
EMT's suit, the defendant's widow vowed to "haul" anyone on her property who needed
ambulance services "to the curb" in order to avoid future suits by injured rescuers. Jane E. Dee,
Are Homeowners Liable for Rescuers 'Injuries?-The 'Fireman 's Rule'Debate Broadens After
an EMT, Who Slipped on Ice, Wins Lawsuit, HARTFORD COURANT, April 2, 1999, at Al.
144. Once the fireman's rule is abolished, this preference may lead businesses to hire and to
train more employees to deal with these perils. The business preference for rescuers who will
not sue may even bring into existence private security firms which, by contract, offer the rescue
services policemen and firefighters have long offered but which promise not to sue, or to allow
their employees to sue. This promise could be provided either through contract between the
security firm, its employees, and the business, or-if contracts not to sue are unenforceable-
through a promise by the security firm to indemnify the business should a renegade employee of
the security firm sue the business successfully.
145. The common law public necessity privilege reflects the importance of providing
rescuers the proper incentives in emergencies. That privilege currently relieves those acting to
quell a public danger from fear of liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263 (1965)
[Vol. 82:745
A FRESH LOOK AT THE FIREMAN'S RULE
from perils, including the risk to the professional rescuers who are eventually
summoned, may increase.'
46
Granted, the liability insurance coverage that many defendants possess for injuries
to professional rescuers should contain this undesirable effect of abolishing the
fireman's rule. Knowing they have some liability coverage if professional rescuers are
injured, defendants facing an emergency should be more inclined to call in the
professional rescuers immediately, as society would wish. The defendant's liability
insurance is especially likely to have this effect if a successful suit against defendant by
the rescuer will not lead to an increase in defendant's liability insurance premiums.
And, as discussed before, these liability insurers are not likely to experience rate
insureds for this sporadic and irregular liability risk.147 Ofcourse, insofar as defendants
believe their liability insurance limits may fall short of the expected liability to the
rescuer, their liability insurance may not overcome their undesirable incentive created
by abolition of the fireman's rule to deal with perils without involving the
professionals.
In summary, the case for abolishing the fireman's rule derives its best argument
from the improved incentive for potential defendants to take care to avoid perils. On
the other hand, abolishing the rule creates an inappropriate incentive for potential
defendants to delay summoning the professionals once a peril is discovered.
10. Other Effects of the Rule on Defendants
The financial effect of abolishing the fireman's rule on a defendant will naturally
turn on whether the defendant possesses adequate liability insurance to cover the tort
judgments against him. Of the potential defendants liable to rescuers, home and
business owner defendants are more likely to have liability insurance than crime victim
and renter defendants. The standardized liability insurance policies for home and
business owners should cover the rescuer's tort judgment. Those policies do not yet
contain any exclusions from coverage that might give the insurer grounds for refusing
to defend, or refusing to indemnify, the defendant. The standard exclusion for
"expected and intended harm"148 would not jeopardize defendant's coverage unless he
intentionally caused the emergency by, for example, committing arson. A defendant
who committed arson or intended some other harm, of course, could not invoke the
fireman's rule in the first place.' 49 As long as defendant did not desire the peril, but
(destruction of chattel in order to avoid public disaster is privileged); see also Preudhomme v.
Stebbins, 55 N.Y.S.2d 397, 400 (1945) (defendant privileged to seize or destroy dogs suspected
of rabies). One salutary effect is to give the actor the socially desirable incentive of mitigating
the overall harm, rather than the incentive to mitigate the harm to any particular business or
individual like the potential defendant. The fireman's rule preserves this incentive.
146. Brandon K. Dreiman, Comment, Extending the Fireman's Rule to Great Britain:
Protecting British Citizens from Tort Liability for Firefighters' Line-of-Duty Injuries, 8 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 381 (1998) (describing the increase in overall risk from amateur efforts
to deal with perils for which professional rescuers are trained).
147. See supra text accompanying note 131.
148. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAw AND REGULATION 172 (4th ed. 2005) (standard
homeowner policy).
149. An exception to the fireman's rule exists for intentional wrongdoing. See supra text
accompanying notes 37-39.
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caused it negligently, no doubts about his coverage under the current liability policies
should arise.
One possible effect of abolishing the firemen's rule, then, is that liability insurers
will seek to change their policies in order to avoid covering the risk of liability to
professional rescuers. The likely method of doing so would be to add an exclusion
tailored to this liability risk. But there is no obvious reason why liability insurers
should be more reluctant to cover the liability risk to rescuers than they are to cover the
liability risks they currently cover. From their perspective, abolition of the fireman's
rule would create a business opportunity to offer coverage of this new liability risk now
facing their insureds. Rather than exclude coverage, liability insurers would be more
likely to point out to their insureds their new tort exposure, increase the premiums they
charge their insureds, and, perhaps, urge them to opt for a higher limit. 50
Abolishing the rule imposes more severe dislocation costs on those defendants who
lack any liability insurance or self-insurance. Crime victims and premises renters
exemplify such defendants. 15 1 An uninsured premises renter is at least as likely as an
insured premises owner to be negligent in a manner that causes a peril. In such cases
the injured professional rescuer, though preferring to sue someone with liability
insurance, may find no such party.152 After all, those owning residences are not
vicariously liable for the negligence of their renters. With no financially responsible
defendant, the injured rescuer may opt to sue a crime victim or renter who lacks
liability insurance rather than not sue at all.
While tort suits against those without any liability insurance or self-insurance are
rarely brought,153 the dislocation costs 54 of such suits when brought deserve some
attention. In such suits, of course, the defendant alone bears his attorney fees and other
defense expenses regardless of the outcome, and those fees and expenses may be
considerable. Moreover, the same peril which led to the rescuer's injury is also likely
to have caused the defendant a recent and significant financial loss. A defendant who
lacks liability insurance to cover his loss from the rescuer's suit is also likely to lack
first-party insurance for his own loss, as modem homeowner's and renter's insurance
typically cover both losses. While an ample literature supports imposing liability in
order to mitigate the dislocation costs of an injured plaintiff who lacks first-party
insurance, comparatively little attention has been accorded the dislocation costs of
150. Because mortgage lenders insist on borrowers obtaining homeowner's or business
insurance as a condition of the loan, many individual borrowers may feel this insurance was
forced upon them and may resent premium increases on this insurance more than on more
elective insurance.
151. The renter's guests are also less likely to have liability insurance than a property owner.
152. In some states guests and renters are treated as additional insureds under the liability
insurance policy of the landlord. This liability insurance coverage would naturally render
injured rescuers more inclined to sue the negligent guest or renter. See Lexington Ins. Co. v.
Raboin, 723 A.2d 397, 397 (Del.) (embracing what is known as the Sutton rule), aff'g 712 A.2d
1011 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998); Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478, 482 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975).
153. Baker, supra note 135, at 275 (discussing how rarely suits are brought against those
without liability insurance).
154. The term "dislocation costs" comes from Calabresi and refers here to the disruptive
effect that tort liability can have on the life of a liable defendant without liability insurance.
CALABRESi, supra note 21, at 97.
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liability on a defendant who lacks liability insurance.' 55 Yet the financial blow to such
a defendant of having to pay a tort judgment will often exceed the blow to injured
plaintiffs denied recovery if only because, thanks to the tradition ofplaintifl's attorneys
charging contingency fees, unsuccessful plaintiffs escape paying for their attorney and
for other litigation expenses, 56 while a liable defendant cannot. 157
Naturally the fireman's rule, like all "no duty" or "no proximate cause" rules, saves
defendant from the expense and risks of defending against false claims and being
subjected to mistaken verdicts. It also protects defendants against tort law's notorious
disregard of the relative fault of one defendant compared to another. For example, a
fire peril may be caused by minor negligence of a landlord and by much more culpable
negligence of a tenant. But if the landlord is richer or better insured than the tenant, the
liability burden is likely to fall disproportionately on the landlord. Tort law gives the
injured firefighter the power to decide to sue only the landlord. Alternatively, even
when the tenant's greater culpability is recognized by the factfinder, the tort principle
of joint and several liability, where it still exists, may lead to the landlord paying the
entire judgment while the renter is protected by his lack of wealth or lack of liability
insurance. Joint and several liability exemplifies a number of pro-plaintiff tort
principles which are based on the assumption-more likely true in the era when the
principles were propounded-that an injured plaintiff must recover in tort to be
compensated at all. All these principles can operate unjustly, and hence should not be
uncritically applied, when first-party benefits are ample.
On balance, this discussion in Part II.B, which attempts to look beyond the
rationales for the fireman's rule and their shortcomings to the ease of application and
the various possible effects of the rule, argues forcefully in favor of the rule. Abolition
of the rule would inflict serious problems of proof on factfinders. It would devote more
of society's limited resources to litigation, and would further enhance the power of
lawyers over the public. Abolition will lead to professional rescuers suing some
member of the public but not others who appear equally negligent. In time, abolition
would threaten to create at least the appearance of professional rescuers being more
willing to risk themselves to save the life and property of some members of the public
than of others similarly situated. Suits by professional rescuers arising from a peril may
raise doubts about the integrity of the subsequent investigation of the peril, and
undermine the public perception of rescuers, the morale of the squad, and the self-
respect of individual rescuers. The incentive the prospect of tort recovery gives
rescuers to exaggerate their injuries and malinger collides head-on with the culture and
the norms that help rescuers serve their mission. Crime victims and home and business
owners who are aware of the toxic character of litigation, especially for defendants,
155. Cresci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967), depicts the plight of a tort defendant
whose liability insurance was insufficient and who actually ended up paying "blood money."
Yet that tort defendant, despite her many travails, at least avoided the further burden facing the
wholly uninsured of being forced to pay her attorney fees.
156. Litigation expenses are typically forwarded by plaintiff's attorneys who, in the event the
case fails, do not seek reimbursement from their client.
157. So great is the expense of defending a tort suit without liability insurance that many
foreign governments finance legal aid agencies for such defendants. See MARKESINIS ET AL.,
supra note 100, at 215-17; Earl Johnson Jr., The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An
International Perspective, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 345 (1985).
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may, when faced with a peril, think twice about summoning the professionals, much to
the disadvantage of society.
A fair assessment must lay against these and other disadvantages of abolishing the
fireman's rule the advantages of better deterrence of negligence by crime victims and
home and business owners that endangers responding professional rescuers, as well as
the moral gain from retribution for this negligence. But in light of the other incentives
operating on potential defendants, liability seems likely to yield only a modest
improvement in precaution taking against police and fire perils. Because the value of
retribution will turn on the severity and degree of culpability of the defendant's
negligence, few generalizations are possible beyond the observation that many of these
perils are triggered by momentary inadvertence or other negligence that arouses little
desire for retribution.
Part II has evaluated the fireman's rule in light of such suggested tort goals as
corrective justice, retributive justice, ease of administration, and the encouragement of
socially desirable behavior. It is time to evaluate the rule in light of compensation
goals, in particular, in light of the rescuers being premium planners for their injuries
compared to most tort plaintiffs.
III. How PLAINTIFF BEING A PREMIUM PLANNER FOR His INJURIES
AFFECTS THE CASE FOR THE FIREMAN'S RULE
In looking at the advantages to society of handling the injury to professional
rescuers solely through first-party benefits rather than also through a tort suit, the
reader must remember that the issue is not which method of handling these injuries is
better, but rather whether, given that first-party benefits will be provided to
professional rescuers, 158 the rescuer should also be allowed a tort suit against the
negligent crime victim or home or business owner. Because the issue is whether
additional compensation should be allowed, it is more pertinent to show, for example,
that the rescuer's first-party benefits adequately compensate him than to show that
those first-party benefits can be provided to the injured rescuer at much lower cost to
society than can the benefits of a tort action. Nevertheless, appreciating the savings
from handling these injuries through first-party benefits, rather than through a tort
action, sheds light on whether a tort action should also be allowed.
Society gains when injuries are adequately insured against at the lowest cost. Hence
society incurs unnecessary costs when tort law shifts the cost of an injury to a party
who can only insure against the injury by paying higher insurance premiums than
another party would need to pay for equal coverage. Other things equal,' 59 tort law will
avoid excess accident costs by finding the better insuring party and placing the injury
risk on it.' 60 In addition, accurate grading of premiums is an important policy goal in
158. The uncertainty and delay of tort recovery assure that professional rescuers and their
representatives will arrange for substantial first-party benefits even if the fireman's rule is
abolished.
159. The major factor that needs to be equal is the relative precaution-taking ability of the
parties-assuming that some cost-justified precaution against the injury was available to at least
one of those parties.
160. It has long been recognized that tort law imposes unnecessary costs on society when it
imposes liability on a party who can only cover that liability by paying relatively high insurance
premiums. Making defendant insure accomplishes desired accident cost avoidance at an
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any insurance scheme. As the discussion below demonstrates, those providing a
professional rescuer's first-party benefits are better able to estimate the likelihood of a
professional rescuer being injured on the job than the defendant's liability insurer is
able to estimate the likelihood of its insured negligently causing a peril that leads to a
rescuer's injury. 161 The first-party-benefit providers are also better able to estimate the
likely severity of such injuries. Hence the first-party-benefit providers, facing less
uncertainty, 162 can better evaluate this risk.
A. Why the Professional Rescuers' First-Party Insurers Can Insure Better than
Defendant's Liability Insurers Against the Injury Risk to Rescuers
The better evaluator of the likelihood and severity of the injury will not always be
the better insurer. If, for example, the better risk evaluator cannot purchase insurance
or otherwise diversify against the injury for some reason-and there are many reasons
why the market might fail to make such insurance available to him' 63-then the better
risk evaluator may be a poorer insurer against the injury risk than a party with less
ability to evaluate the risk but less difficulty in insuring against it. But this qualification
need not detain us, for the market generally makes insurance coverage of injuries to
professional rescuers available both to the rescuers and to most defendants. First-party-
benefit providers are readily available to the rescuers, and liability insurers are readily
available at least to those defendants who own a home or business. 164 Moreover, actual
experience confirms that a great deal of first-party benefits and liability insurance
covering these injuries to rescuers is in fact purchased, thereby eliminating any concern
that unforeseen obstacles against coverage exist. If we assume plaintiffs and defendants
enjoy equal ability to diversify against the losses arising from these injuries by buying
insurance, the superior ability of one party or his representative or insurer to evaluate
the risk of injury argues for assigning the risk of injury to that wiser insurer. Such a tort
unnecessary cost when an equally good accident-cost-avoiding plaintiff could buy insurance at a
lower rate:
The effect of allocating costs to parties that can spread only by paying relatively
high insurance premiums is that unnecessary costs of spreading are introduced into
the system .... [B]y ignoring which of the litigants is the cheapest avoider of
secondary costs, the [fault system] may burden a litigant who is not the cheapest
avoider of the sum of primary and secondary costs. And this ultimately results in
unnecessary costs being borne.
CALABRES, supra note 21, at 252-53.
161. Another way to state this is that the rescuer's first-party benefit providers can inject the
cost of rescuer injuries into their budget for rescuers more accurately than liability insurers can
inject the cost of their insured's liability to rescuers into the insurer's cost estimates and liability
insurance premiums.
162. Cf Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (denying recovery when
plaintiff faces less uncertainty than defendant in estimating the severity of plaintiff's loss).
163. Ideally, for insurers to offer insurance against a risk, the risk should be independent of
other covered risks; should occur at a regular, predictable rate; and the insurance pool should
contain enough risks for the law of large numbers to operate. ABRAHAM, supra note 132, at 213
(describing the prerequisites for a risk to be insurable).
164. The extent to which crime victims have liability insurance that will cover their liability
to policemen injured in attempts to rescue them is unknown. To the extent crime victims lack
such insurance, the case for retaining the fireman's rule to bar suits against them is naturally
stronger.
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rule will preserve the optimal incentive on the better insurer to plan appropriately for
the risk of the rescuer being injured and will achieve for society his economies in doing
so.
In assessing whether the wiser insurers against the risk of injury to professional
rescuers are the rescuers themselves through their first-party-benefit providers or the
potential defendants through their liability insurers, the notion of rational ignorance
offers some guidance. Social scientists argue that when risks are too difficult to
measure, those affected by the risk will, rationally, remain ignorant about the risk even
when the loss threatened if the risk materializes is substantial. 65 A party facing a risk
about which he is rationally ignorant will rarely be the wiser insurer against that risk.
For example, the likelihood that consumers of a product will rationally remain ignorant
about remote risks to themselves from using the product provides a powerful reason for
presuming that the product seller is a wiser evaluator of the product's risks and for
assigning to the seller the risks of injury, even though the consumer has a clearer vision
of how he will use the product.
The concept of rational ignorance bears on the inquiry here because, if the fireman's
rule is abolished, the liability insurers of potential defendants may yet remain rationally
ignorant about the liability risk to a rescuer from their insured's behavior. The liability
risk to rescuers after all, will never constitute a significant fraction of what does
concern these liability insurers, namely, the total liability risk to persons and property
from their insured home or business owner's covered behavior.'1 66 Defendant's liability
insurers, in short, have relatively little reason to become specialists in evaluating the
liability risk just to professional rescuers. Hence, abolishing the fireman's rule is
unlikely to elicit from these liability insurers an especially accurate measurement or
pricing of that liability risk. 1
67
In contrast, the risk to a firefighter or policeman of being injured or killed while
responding to fire or police perils is not a risk about which their union representatives
and other first-party-benefit providers remain rationally ignorant. The injury risk,
consisting of the rate and severity of injuries and disability claims, is large enough to
warrant these agents of professional rescuers undertaking substantial efforts to measure
it accurately. Far from being one of a great many liability risks for injury or property
damage that are being covered, as it is for defendant's liability insurers, the injury risk
to firemen and policemen is the primary focus of the first-party-benefit providers. They
are the natural specialists in evaluating this risk and designing first-party-benefit
packages to insure against it efficiently.
Nor would the liability insurers who did attempt to measure the liability risk to
rescuers from the behavior of their insured home or business owners possess much
165. See Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Economics, Psychology, and Protective
Behavior, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 64 (1978).
166. For example, the insurers will not be covering the liability risk from the insured's
intentional torts and hence will only need to estimate the liability risk to professional rescuers
from the insured's negligence. See Michael Sean Quinn, Liability Coverage for Breaches of
Contract, INS. J., Nov. 20, 2000, http://www.insurancejoumal.com/magazines/southcentral/
2000/11/20/legalbeat/20904.htm (stating that standardized liability insurance policies cover the
insured's negligence but not the foreseeable results of intentional acts). Of course, the fireman's
rule applies only to suits arising from the insured's negligence.
167. Wiser pricing of insurance against a loss means a social savings in handling the loss.
ABRAHAM, supra note 132, at 218.
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capacity to do so. Unlike the first-party-benefit providers, these liability insurers lack
practical access to the factors that determine the injury risk to professional rescuers.
Those factors include: the particular techniques used in each department, the training
and qualifications of the firemen and police, the location of the department and the
type of community it serves, the department's injury record, the quality of the
department's leadership, and the severity of the secondary results of the rescuer's
injury. First-party-benefit providers are also better able to monitor how the injury risk
varies with each particular type of firefighting or police work. Compared to the
rescuer's first-party-benefit providers, the potential defendant's liability insurer knows
little about these criteria and lacks any power to influence them.
True, the liability insurer is better able to learn the characteristics of the defendant
or of the defendant's premises which bear on the risk of a fire or police peril.
Accordingly, the defendant's liability insurer can better estimate the likelihood of a
peril of some kind at the defendant's premises. Its acquaintance with defendant,
however slight, may also give it a more informed hunch about the chance of defendant
negligently causing a peril. Its great difficulty, however, and the aspect on which it is
likely to remain rationally ignorant and markedly inferior to the first-party insurers, lies
in translating its knowledge about the risk of the peril into an estimate of the injury risk
to the rescuers who respond to that peril.
Certain features of our tort system exacerbate the difficulty in measuring liability
risks and suggest that first-party insurers will often be better risk evaluators. One is the
likelihood that there will be many other parties that the rescuer will be able to sue.
With joint and several liability no longer being as widespread as three decades ago, 168
the number of financially responsible defendants before the court substantially affects
the liability burden of each. When an insured homeowner negligently starts a fire that
originates from a stove or furnace, for example, the injured firefighter may also be able
to sue the manufacturer and other sellers of the stove or furnace. If firefighters
responding to the negligence of the insured homeowner are injured by the collapse of a
floor, the firefighters may also be able to sue the builder and even the architect.
Because the liability exposure may turn on a comparison of the culpability of several
defendants, uncertainty about the number of defendants impairs the ability of the
homeowner's liability insurer to predict its exposure and to price the coverage it offers.
Measuring the liability insurer's exposure should the fireman's rule be abolished
also becomes more difficult because of the number of contingencies that must
materialize before that liability occurs. The greater the number of contingencies and
the greater the difficulty in ascertaining the likelihood of each, the greater the insurer's
difficulty in estimating the risk being covered. The insurer must estimate the likelihood
of a peril occurring, of the peril leading to a professional rescuer's injury, of the
injured rescuer deciding to sue, of the rescuer being able to adduce sufficient evidence
of each element of its negligence case, and of the defendant not being able to adduce
sufficient evidence of each element of the contributory negligence defense. The insurer
must also estimate the average damages awarded in such cases, which in turn requires a
host of estimates about, for example, the apportionment of causal negligence under
each state's comparative negligence scheme, and how the jury will resolve highly
168. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-51-2 -7 (2006) (abolishing joint and several liability except
for medical malpractice); UTAH STAT. § 78-27-38 (1990) (abolishing joint and several liability
generally).
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disparate claims of pain and suffering. Empirical work indicating that awards are
significantly higher in poor and African-American neighborhoods means the liability
insurer must also consider the locale in which a trial is likely to be held.' 69 The greater
the liability insurer's difficulty in measuring the liability risk, the poorer its pricing of
the defendant's liability insurance.
The possibility of a punitive damage award against their insured, at least when
neither the liability insurance policy nor each state's law clearly excludes such an
award from coverage, further increases the unpredictability of the liability insurer's
exposure. The more unpredictable the awards, the more resources are required to
estimate them, the greater the reserve the insurer must maintain to cover them, and the
higher the premiums liability insurers must charge.
170
B. Other Savings from Handling These Injuries Through
First-Party Benefits Rather than Tort Liability
The cost of insuring is reduced not only by having the insurance arranged and
purchased by the party who can do so more wisely, but also by having that insurance
administered at lower cost. A look at administrative costs will bring into relief the
shortcomings of compensating injuries through tort liability rather than through first-
party benefits. Getting a dollar's worth of benefits to rescuers through worker's
compensation requires administrative costs of less than thirty cents, through health
insurance ten cents, through social security disability a mere eight cents, and through
most pension plans for police and firefighters one to five cents. 17 While no
comparable data indicates the administrative costs of getting a dollar's worth of
benefits to rescuers under the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program (PSOB), the
fact that it provides a one-time benefit of a flat amount ($267,245.00 to be adjusted for
inflation after passage in 2003) only to those killed on the job (an inexpensive
determination), or permanently injured on the job (a more expensive determination),
suggests that its administrative costs will be greater than Social Security's but less than
Worker Compensation's. To give rescuers a dollar of benefit through the tort system,
in stunning contrast, will require between one and two dollars in administrative
costs. 172
This difference stems primarily from the decreased involvement of attorneys in the
administration of first-party benefits. This, in turn, stems from a number of factors,
including the first-party-benefit provider's greater familiarity with the rescuer's pre-
injury condition and both the benefit provider's and the rescuer's greater familiarity
with the benefits previously provided to the rescuer's injured colleagues. Collective
169. ERIC HELLAND & ALEXANDER TABARROK, JUDGE AND JURY: AMERICAN TORT LAW ON
TRIAL 72 (2006).
170. Paul Rubin, BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages, 5
SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 179, 184 (1977) (discussing the effect of punitive damages awards on the
overall variance and predictability of tort awards).
171. BELL& O'CONNELL, supra note 99, at 105; TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note
11, at 402.
172. TILLNGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 11, at 423; see also STAFF OF J. ECON. COMM.,
108TH CONG., CHOICE IN AUTO INSURANCE: UPDATED SAVINGS ESTIMATES FOR AUTO CHOICE,
app. A, at 14 (Comm. Print 2003) (report of Dan Miller). In 2001, attorneys' fees in auto injury
cases alone totaled $16.74 billion. Id.
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valuation of damages, such as the valuation of lost earnings through damage schedules,
yields significant savings in the administration of first-party benefits. All of these
factors also reduce concerns about overclaiming by the rescuer. In contrast, allowing
the rescuer to sue will set in motion the entire individualized apparatus of torts. The
stigma that liability for negligence still carries would itself probably guarantee attorney
involvement, even if the procedures of torts did not. That attorney involvement, in turn,
guarantees a stunning increase in the costs of administration. Efforts to compare the
costs of worker's compensation systems in different states emphasize how even slight
increases in attorney involvement in the operation of that system can dramatically raise
its administrative costs.
173
Granted, greater attorney involvement results from the different, and more
ambitious, goals of the tort system. These goals include resolving the culpability of the
parties, improving safety by identifying and deterring negligence, and compensating
the rescuer for his pain and suffering. These goals naturally call for much more
evidence, time, and argument.
174
The following example suggests that when the safety gain from liabilities'
deterrence of defendant's negligence is modest, the administrative costs of determining
tort liability need not be very high to swamp that safety gain and render the tort action
a social loss.
Assumptions:
175
* Cost of accident when it occurs (as measured by the tort system when
it awards damages): $10,000176
* Chance of accident when defendant is negligent 177 (i.e., does not take
care): 5%
* Expected costs of accidents when defendant is negligent: $500
($10,000 x 5%)
* Chance of accident when defendant is not negligent (i.e., does take
care): 4%
* Expected costs of accidents when defendant is not negligent: $400
($10,000 x 4%)
173. ORIN KRAMER & RIcHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKER'S COMPENSATION: STRENGTHENING THE
SOCIAL COMPACT91 (2001) (increasing attorney involvement in some jurisdictions has increased
the worker's compensation insurer's spending on claims administration per premium dollar from
sixteen cents to fifty-nine cents, with a corresponding reduction in the percentage of the
insurer's total costs that reach the claimant).
174. CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 219-22.
175. The assumptions do not specify the time period over which the costs are measured. The
reader may assume these are the costs over any time period (e.g., a month).
176. As discussed supra, see text accompanying notes 141-142, assuming that the social cost
of an injury equals the average tort damage award for the injury is highly suspect. Nevertheless,
that assumption has become conventional in legal scholarship, and for the limited purpose of
this example, I adopt that convention.
177. The jury must find both that defendant was negligent and that his negligence was a
cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury before it can find defendant liable. For simplification, a finding
of cause-in-fact is assumed whenever defendant is found negligent.
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* Reduction in expected costs of accident from defendant taking care:
$100 ($500 - $400)
* Defendant's cost of taking care: $80 (So, $80 being less than $100,
taking care is cost-justified and defendant who does not take care is
negligent.)
" Chance of court system finding defendant negligent and liable even
when defendant has taken care, and hence, is not negligent: 10%
* Chance of court system finding defendant negligent and liable when
defendant has not taken care and hence is negligent: 100%
* Plaintiffs cost of suing (i.e., administrative costs): $900178
* Defendant's cost of defending (i.e., administrative costs): $900
Results of Assumptions:
* Plaintiff will always sue after an accident because his expected benefit
from suing, even when defendant has taken care, is $1000 (10%
chance of winning x $10,000), which exceeds his $900 cost of suing.
* Because plaintiff will always sue, defendant will have sufficient
incentive to take care. Doing so only costs defendant $80 and reduces
defendant's expected liability expense much more than that, from
$545 ((5% chance of accident) x ($10,000 cost of accident + $900
cost of defending)) to $43.60 ((10% chance of losing despite taking
care) x (4% chance of accident) x ($10,000 cost of accident + $900
cost of defending)), a gain of $501.40.
* Total cost to society of a rule imposing liability on defendant when
defendant is negligent: $552 ($80 cost of defendant taking care + 4 %
chance of accident x ($10,000 + $1800 cost of suing and defending
when there is an accident).
* Total cost to society of a rule rejecting liability even when defendant
is negligent: $500 (5% x $10,000).
In other words, it is quite easy for the plaintiff s administrative costs of suing plus
defendant's administrative costs of defending (in light of the risk of an erroneous
judgment of liability) to swamp the social benefits inhering in the extra precaution
taking by defendant that liability for negligence induces. The administrative costs of
liability are even more likely to swamp liability's precaution-taking benefits if the
prospect of tort recovery reduces plaintiff's incentive to take care for himself, thereby
reducing the overall precaution-taking benefit of liability. As long as imposing liability
for negligence does not greatly reduce accident costs, and the administrative costs
when plaintiffs sue are substantial, society may be better off enduring the extra
accident costs that imposing liability for negligence would eliminate.
178. Unlike the amount of liability, which is a mere wealth transfer, these administrative
costs are no less of a cost to society than the accident costs.
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The example also suggests that even when liability for negligence is socially
undesirable, plaintiff's private gain from suing-the expected settlement orjudgment
he will receive minus his cost of suing-may render suing desirable for plaintiff. After
all, plaintiff need not bear any of the costs that his suit inflicts on defendant, nor need
plaintiff bear the risk of an erroneous finding that the defendant was liable. Indeed,
whenever the chance of an erroneous verdict in plaintiffs favor is greater than the
chance of an erroneous verdict in defendant's favor, it may be sensible for plaintiff to
sue. 179
C. Further Reasons for Handling These Injuries Through
First-Party Benefits Rather than Tort Liability
Another advantage of handling injuries to rescuers through first-party benefits only
is the far greater horizontal equity in compensation among injured rescuers that first-
party benefits compared to tort liability achieve. Horizontal equity refers to the extent
to which like injuries receive like compensation and different injuries receive different
compensation commensurate with their severity. The standardized payment schedules
of the first-party-benefit providers tend to assure like compensation for like injuries.
The experience over time from encountering many injuries enables first-party-benefit
providers to refine their sense of how disabling and serious a given injury is relative to
others-a sense that they are able to reflect in their standardized payment schedules. In
contrast, tort damage awards for the same injury fluctuate wildly.1 80 First-party benefits
also achieve horizontal equity among injured rescuers in that rescuers injured by non-
negligently caused perils receive the same compensation as those injured by
negligently caused perils. The tort action, in contrast, only benefits those rescuers
injured by negligently caused perils, and only the fraction of those rescuers who can
find a financially responsible defendant to sue.
The importance of achieving horizontal equity increases the more the injured
plaintiffs are seen as members of a single community. One advantage of handling the
losses of 9/11 through the Victims Compensation Fund (VCF) rather than through tort
liability against the airlines, the airline security companies, the builders of the World
Trade Center, and the many other potential defendants, was the far greater horizontal
equity that was achieved among the injured and the survivors of the dead. The VCF
operated as, and shared the features of, a first-party benefit not unlike the Public Safety
Officers' Benefits Program (PSOB). Those operating the fund put a high priority on
horizontal equity in part because the victims soon tended to see themselves as members
of a single community.'18 Horizontal equity was called for by the sense of community
179. This point-that private plaintiffs may find suing worthwhile even when society does
not-has been made by many others. See, e.g., SHAVELL, ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 11, at 290.
180. PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY
161-62 (1986) ("Under current damage rules, the range of uncertainty is enormous because of
the discretion left to the court in determining such factors as rates of inflation of wages and
medical expense, discounting, treatment of taxes, compensation for pain and suffering, and now
in some states, discretionary offset of collateral compensation and periodic payment of future
damages.").
181. Robert Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed
Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 776 (2003); KAI T. ERICKSON,
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between the victims and in turn helped to build more solidarity and sense of
community, a result widely seen to be therapeutic and desirable in itself.8 2 Plainly,
these rationales apply a fortiori to professional rescuers. Few, if any, vocations develop
closer affinity or a more compelling sense of membership in a community. Few
missions benefit more from strengthening those bonds.
Several factors render the loss from injury to professional rescuers more amenable
to scheduling and hence more appropriately handled through first-party benefits than,
say, the loss to those injured in car accidents.18 3 Injured professional rescuers are
drawn from a more homogeneous economic group than are the young children,
housewives, retired persons, and high-income adults who may be injured in car
accidents. The typical professional rescuer is a wage earner within a fairly narrow age
range and even narrower salary range. In addition, the on-the-job injuries to
professional rescuers do not vary quite as much from each other as do the injuries to
those in car accidents.
The need to compensate professional rescuers for their non-pecuniary losses, such
as pain and suffering, is also less compelling than for many plaintiffs. As mentioned
previously, the firefighter or policeman injured in attempting a rescue of the potential
defendant or his property suffers little dignitary harm from the defendant's negligence
compared to other tort plaintiffs. The professional rescuer's training and expectations
render it less likely that the professional rescuer will feel wronged by the defendant. As
the potential defendant and the professional rescuers are invariably strangers before the
peril, the professional rescuer will possess less reason than many other plaintiffs to feel
defendant's negligence was a personal affront. 8 4 Insofar as non-pecuniary damages, in
particular damages for pain and suffering, aim to redress the dignitary harm the
defendant has inflicted on the plaintiff, the argument for awarding them to professional
rescuers loses much of its force. Of course the pain and suffering from the rescuer's
injuries are a genuine loss. But with j ob-related injury and its attendant pain being such
an omnipresent aspect of his work, the rescuer lives with the anticipation of that pain
and suffering every day, a factor that, according to some research, mitigates its
EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO CREEKFLOOD 186-245
(1976) (disasters often lead victims to a heightened emphasis on community).
182. Other societies also attach great importance to horizontal equity in the compensation of
persons they regard as victims of terrorism. Janet Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror
Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAuL L. REV. 627,658-60 (2003). For example, the government of
Israel provides the same compensation to all victims of terrorism, even though its tort system,
like ours, gives much more divergent compensation to tort plaintiffs. The Israeli government is
even careful to provide civilian victims of terrorism with the same compensation provided
injured soldiers. Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 5730-1970, 24 LSI 131 (1969-70)
(Isr.). In the midst of its civil disorders, Northern Ireland likewise created a compensation fund
that strove to provide equal compensation to equally-injured victims of intentional wrongdoing
in order to achieve horizontal equity. Criminal Injuries Compensation (Northern Ireland) Order
2003 para. 30 (N.I. 1 of 2003) (N. Ir.); see also Hellel Sommer, Providing Compensation for
Harm Caused by Terrorism: Lessons Learned in the Israeli Experience, 36 IND. L. REV. 335
(2003).
183. Ray Brown, Automobile Accident Litigation in Wisconsin: A Factual Study, 10 Wis. L.
REV. 170 (1934).
184. The rescuer is much more likely to view as a personal affront the negligence by the
defendant that occurs after the rescuer has arrived at the scene. But the fireman's rule does not
block the rescuer's suit for damages inflicted by such negligence.
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effect.' 85 Compared to other injured plaintiffs, injured premium planners like
professional rescuers can be more justly confined to their pecuniary losses, which their
first-party benefits typically eliminate.
Fans of tort liability may insist that the goal of compensatory justice can never be
achieved unless injured plaintiffs are allowed to recover for pain and suffering. "' But
it may yet be true that the administrative costs of compensating for pain and suffering
exceed the social value of that compensation. Certainly the administrative costs of
compensating for pain and suffering, especially when these damages are determined
individually, are unusually high. Compared to the claims for other items of damages,
the claims for pain and suffering damages diverge more wildly. And opponents must
take these claims seriously, given the jury's unlimited discretion over them. The great
divergence and uncertainty of possible awards for pain and suffering means that
establishing the amount of this compensation will call for more evidence, attorney
involvement, and time than would establishing the amount of other compensation. Is
the social value of empowering the jury to set a monetary measure of plaintiff's pain
and suffering great enough to swamp the measurement difficulties and other costs of
doing so? Similar measurement difficulties have led some courts to refuse to allow
damages for the loss of consortium suffered by the parents or children of injured
plaintiffs.
18 7
Handling the professional rescuer's loss through his first-party benefits rather than
through a tort suit will also economize on the social costs of exaggerated or fraudulent
claims. Tort suits between strangers, like the professional rescuer and his defendant,
invite overclaiming. Thanks in part to the pre-injury relationship between the first-
party-benefit provider and the claimant, the first-party-benefit provider, in contrast,
likely knows the claimant's earlier condition and can better limit overclaiming.
Finally, an advantage of first-party benefits over tort awards is that first-party
benefits are rarely paid in a lump sum. As a result they can be adjusted based on the
injured person's recovery over time. This capacity to adjust benefits over time further
reduces the social costs of overclaiming.
D. Why Professional Rescuers Are Likely to Obtain Sufficient First-Party Benefits
Many of the arguments for expanding liability rely on the empirical claim that
potential plaintiffs are unlikely to value the injury risk to themselves properly, and
hence will not obtain sufficient, or even nearly sufficient, first-party benefits for
themselves and their survivors. Guido Calabresi is perhaps the most notable champion
of this view. Calabresi argues that what he calls optimal loss-spreading can therefore
only be achieved by tort liability. But none of the reasons he gives for why plaintiffs
185. TERRY BURNHAM & JAY PHELAN, MEAN GENES 123-28 (2000) (citing research showing
that anticipation of loss reduces the emotional impact of the loss).
186. Because pain and suffering from an injury is not a loss most people would voluntarily
buy insurance against, one can infer that most people view compensation for pain and suffering
as less important to them than compensation for those losses against which they do buy
insurance. Of course, when tort law forces defendants to pay for the rescuer's pain and suffering,
that law forces all defendant crime victims and home or business owners who buy liability
insurance to insure against the rescuer's pain and suffering.
187. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977).
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are unlikely to value their injury risk properly and buy sufficient first-party benefits
apply to groups of professional rescuers or their representatives.
Calabresi insists that potential plaintiffs undervalue the injury risk to themselves for
three reasons. First, they lack "the data necessary to determine how great the risk is,
how large the losses are apt to be if they occur, and how serious the secondary results
of such losses would be."' 88 Calabresi contrasts these plaintiffs with parties, typically
defendants, who can "view the injury risk as a statistic," and who therefore can
"evaluate it clearly."' 89 These are the parties to whom, Calabresi maintains, tort law
should allocate the injury risk. Yet in the context of the fireman's rule, the better
evaluators of the risk of injury to the professional rescuers, as discussed above, are the
rescuers' own representatives and first-party-benefit providers who specialize in
covering that risk.
Calabresi's second reason relies on his assertion that the future plaintiff is
psychologically unable to evaluate the risk sensibly even when he possesses all the
pertinent data. However plausible this may be when plaintiff is an isolated individual
facing a remote risk of injury to himself, its plausibility is nil in the context of the
fireman's rule. Invariably, the professional rescuer is represented by union employees
or civil servants who accept as part of their job description the obligation to understand
and predict the rescuer's injury risk. The cognitive distortions Calabresi mentions
primarily interfere with a person's ability to evaluate the risk of injury to himself. But
the representatives of professional rescuers are not evaluating the risk of injury to
themselves. Moreover, the representatives of large police or fire departments will
regularly see professional rescuers actually injured, an experience that should help
them overcome any tendency to understate the injury risk. The existence of the
rescuers' representatives guarantees that the cognitive breakdowns that would prevent
proper evaluation of, and planning against, the rescuer's injury risks will not
materialize.
Calabresi's third reason for believing plaintiffs undervalue the injury risk to
themselves is what he terms "the Faust attitude," by which he means an unduly high
personal discount rate which leads potential plaintiffs to value properly only immediate
costs, while undervaluing long-run costs like the chance and aftereffects of an on-the-
job injury.190 Calabresi notes immediately that this reason would not apply to those
who purchase first-party benefits and plan for injury as a group: "[a] correlate of this
view is that people as a group, or people when they set up general or collective norms,
are less likely to view only the short run than are people deciding individually. They
are less likely to yield to temptation collectively.'' 91 As the rescuer's first-party
benefits are arranged by a group, this reason for assuming those benefits will be
insufficient does not apply.
Calabresi further suggests that a devious Faust may fail to arrange first-party
benefits because he believes that if his injury renders him destitute, society's public
assistance programs will come to his rescue. But throughout the country, the amount of
the professional rescuer's first-party benefits render him ineligible for such public
188. CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 56.
189. Id.
190. According to legend, Faust made a pact with the Devil for immediate, earthly gains in
return for the loss of his soul.
191. CALABREs,supra note 21, at 57.
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assistance. The rescuer's representative is not a Faust who underpurchases first-party
benefits knowing that Marguerite's hard work'92 in the form of public assistance will
save the rescuer in the end.
193
E. Reasons for Believing the Professional Rescuers 'Actual First-Party
Benefits Adequately Fulfill Society's Compensation Goals
1. Facts about Current Benefits
While the first-party-benefit packages of professional rescuers injured in attempting
a rescue or in responding to a police or fire peril vary considerably from place to
place, 194 their similarities support some generalizations: These packages were
constructed in the expectation that the rescuer would enjoy no other major source of
compensation such as a tort recovery. The packages are substantially more generous
than the package of benefits offered other public employees, one reason being that the
other employees do not face as significant a risk of physical injury. The package of
first-party benefits for police and firemen is also substantially more generous than the
usual workers compensation package, even though many workers covered only by
worker's compensation face a greater risk of on-the-job injury. 19
Professional rescuers injured through responding to a peril on the job will not be
limited to what are often called "ordinary disability benefits."' 96 These are the benefits
available to rescuers injured while employed but not injured on the job. These
"ordinary disability benefits," which are themselves rarely available to other full-time
192. In some versions of the Faust legend, Faust is allowed out of his bargain and redeemed
in the end because of the pleas and virtuous efforts of his lover, Marguerite.
193. Calabresi acknowledges that when tort liability does not yield clear gains in primary or
secondary accident cost avoidance, courts should reject tort liability in favor of the relative
administrative efficiency of first-party compensation:
The third subgoal of accident cost reduction.., involves reducing the costs of
administering our treatment of accidents. It may be termed "tertiary" because its
aim is to reduce the costs of achieving primary and secondary cost reduction. But
in a very real sense this "efficiency" goal comes first. It tells us to question
constantly whether an attempt to reduce accident costs, either by reducing
accidents themselves or by reducing their secondary effects, costs more than it
saves.
CALABRESi, supra note 22, at 28.
What Calabresi calls "secondary costs" are not real costs but rather the distributive
consequences of the failure to transfer payment to one injured by an accident. The absence of
this transfer payment in itself carries no allocative results. Only that fraction of the premium
required to buy insurance against the accident that represents the insurer's loading costs is a real
cost. See Richard Posner, Book Review, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 636 (1970).
194. The benefits described in this subsection do not necessarily apply to volunteer firemen.
For the benefits of volunteers, see NATIONAL VOLUNTEER FIRE COUNCIL, STATE BY STATE
COMPARISON: WORK COMP, http://www.nvfc.org/benefits/state-by-state-work-comp.php (last
visited Apr. 2, 2007).
195. See Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1977) (listing some benefits in California and
describing how they compare with worker's comp benefits).
196. See, e.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-155 (2006) (describing ordinary duty benefits for
illnesses such as cancer and who is limited to them).
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employees, usually amount to about 50% of current salary. 197 Rather, the professional
rescuers who would be able to sue if the fireman's rule was abolished' 98 will be entitled
to what are called "disability duty benefits," or in some states "line of duty benefits.'
199
These benefits more commonly equal 67-80% of current salary.20 0 Moreover, these
disability benefits are tax-free. 20 1 The result is that the injured rescuer's disability
benefits approach his pre-injury income, after subtracting from that pre-injury income
his taxes and his non-deductible costs of employment, such as his expenses for
commuting and for dress. Several large cities, like New York, provide unlimited sick
leave to police and firemen injured on the job, partly to reduce the cost of processing
202
claims. Injured rescuers who are totally disabled in responding to a police or fire
peril remain eligible for the Social Security disability benefits available to all so
disabled.20 3
These disability benefits should be kept distinct from the retirement pensions for
professional rescuers, the generosity of which is well known.2 04 Time spent on
197. See id. ("Ordinary disability benefits shall be 50% of the policeman's salary....").
198. Firemen who could sue, for example, would include all those who suffer "fireground"
injuries (i.e., injuries at the site of the fire), as well as those injured en route (e.g., through
collisions involving the fire truck), and those injured at the station house in preparation for
response (e.g., in descending the fire pole). In 1997 the total number of injuries to firemen was
43,080, which included ninety-one deaths. UNITED STATES FIRE ADMINISTRATION, FEMA,
FIREFIGHTER FATALITIES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1998 (1999), available at
http://usfa.fema.gov/pdf/ff_fat98.pdf. See also National Fire Protection Association Survey of
Fire Departments for U.S. Fire Experience (1998). In eight of the ten years preceding 2003,
deaths totaled between ninety and 105, with heart attacks being the most common cause of
death. Rita Fahy & Paul LeBlanc, On Duty Deaths: Firefighter Fatalities 2002, NAT'L FIRE
PROTECTION Ass'N J., Jul.-Aug. 2003, at 56.
199. E.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-154(a) (2006) (line of duty benefits); VA. CODE ANN. §§
9.1-400 to 402 (2006) (disability duty benefits).
200. E.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-154 (Illinois's disability benefits, at 75% of wages, are
typical.). Given their special disability coverage, injured professional rescuers are not usually
entitled to worker's compensation benefits. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 7-206
(West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011 (West 2006); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 504.001-.073
(Vernon 2006); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.03 (West 2003).
201. I.R.C. § 104(a)(l) (2002).
202. N.Y. CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS FOR NEW YORK CITY 36 (2005),
available at http://www.ibo.nye.ny.us/iboreports/options2005.pdf.
203. See SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, DISABILITY AND S.S.I., http://www.ssa.gov/d&sl.htm
(last visited Apr. 2, 2007); see also CONCERNS OF POLICE SURVIVORS, INC., LINE-OF-DUTY
DEATH BENEFITS: BENEFITS FOR ALL OFFICERS 11-13 http://www.nationalcops.org/forms/
benefits/all.pdf (2006) (informing survivors of police officers about their eligibility for Social
Security benefits); WISCONSIN PROFESSIONAL POLICEASSOCIATION, http://www.wppa.com/news/
archive/nuts and boltsofduty disabilit.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2007). These benefits are
limited to about $2000 per month.
204. Police and firefighters typically may retire with full pension benefits at a younger age
and with less service than other private or public sector employees. Two-fifths of police and
firefighters need to fulfill only a service requirement before becoming eligible for full benefits at
any age. Another two-fifths have an age requirement of 55 or younger. This compares with less
than 10% of other full-time employees who could retire after meeting a service requirement
only, and fewer than 5% who could retire with full benefits at age 55 or younger. In addition to
being able to retire younger with full benefits, police and firefighters tend to receive more
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disability, especially when the disability arises from a line-of-duty injury, counts
toward the time in service needed to qualify for the retirement pension.20 5 Departments
differ, however, on the extent to which a person whose disability prevents his return to
the force will qualify for the full retirement pension.
20 6
Most professional rescuers still enjoy what had historically been an expensive
feature of all worker's compensation plans as well: first dollar coverage of all medical
expenses arising from on-the-job injuries. First dollar coverage means complete
coverage with no obligation to pay a deductible or co-insurance portion and sometimes
with no restriction on the insured's choice of physician or facility.20 7 The package of
benefits also includes COBRA health insurance coverage for rescuers leaving the
profession.
20 8
When rescuers responding to a peril are killed, the first-party benefits for their
survivors fulfill society's compensation goals even more clearly. Not surprisingly, the
packages provide for funeral expenses and some life insurance. In addition, the
packages include as many as three special death benefits. Every state has provided
some special death benefit for which survivors of professional rescuers who die on
generous pension benefits than do other public and private employees. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, BULL. No. 2398, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS, 1990, at 86-87 (1992). Because the percentage of their salary used to determine
the final pension benefit is often greater than that for other employees, the percentage of final
salary replaced by the pension benefit is typically higher. Indeed police and firemen have the
highest defined benefit pension plan replacement rates of any occupational group. See id. at 84-
85; see also MD. CODE ANN., [STATE PERS. & PENS.] § § 28-101 to -403 (LexisNexis 2004); 40
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-101 to -144 (LexisNexis 2004); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-101 to
-226 (LexisNexis 2004); D.C. CODE §§ 4-601 to -634 (2001); ALASKA STAT. §§ 39.35.010 to
.690 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-7-1 to -126 (2000). Although the professional rescuers'
defined benefit plans would allow them to be exempt from Social Security taxes, about two-
thirds of professional rescuers participate, allowing them to supplement their other retirement
benefits with Social Security. See I.R.C. § 3121 (b)(7)(F) (2002); see also Michael Bucci, Police
and Firefighter Pension Plans, 115 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 37 (Nov. 1992).
205. See, e.g., PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 5-305 (2006), available at http://www.portland
online.com/auditor/index.cfln?a=21454&c=28295 (providing retirement benefits to past
employees of the Bureau of Fire and the Bureau of Police, including those who fail to return to
work after recovery from disability).
206. See, e.g., NEwARK, DEL., PENSION PLAN § 6.4 (2006) (providing those injured in line of
duty at least 75% of current pay and, with minimal time of service, at least 75% of the full
retirement pension); FORT WORTH, TEx., DISABILITY PENSION BENEFITS, available at
http://www.fortworthgov.org/retirement/disbenefits.htm (providing full pension at the earliest
normal retirement date for members injured in the line of duty). But see OKLAHOMA
FIREFIGHTERS, PENSION RETIREMENT SYSTEM, OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 49-109 (2004), available at
http://www.ok.gov/fprs/documents/RULES%20AND%20STATUTES.doc (providing a reduced
pension to firefighters injured in the line of duty unless they served more than twenty years).
207. Lucy Lognivoff Ins. Agency, Insurance Glossary: First-Dollar Coverage, http://www.
autohealthhomeinsurance.com/glossary/first-dollar-coverage.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
208. In a few states, professional rescuers must choose a doctor from a list prepared by their
employer or a doctor whose charges are subject to approval by their employer. See, e.g., WASH.
CIVIL TwP. (IND.), Schedule of Benefits, in EMPLOYEE SUMMARY PLAN DESCRIPTION 12-19
(1992) (setting forth insurance packages and parameters for drug, dental, and medical benefits);
see also Coordination of Benefits, Continuation of Coverage, in EMPLOYEE SUMMARY PLAN
DESCRIPTION, supra, at 47-49 (providing for the extension of insurance benefits package after
leaving the fire service).
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duty would qualify. 209 Many cities have supplemented these with special death benefits
of their own.2 10 At the federal level, the PSOB provides upwards of a quarter-of-a-
million dollars to professional rescuers who are permanently disabled and to the
survivors of those who die while on duty. 211 State and local benefits must not be
reduced by benefits received under the PSOB Act, and the PSOB benefit is not reduced
by any benefit received at the state or local level.
Another common benefit at the state or local level is payment of tuition at public
junior colleges and state universities for the spouse and children of rescuers who are
killed or permanently disabled on duty.212 Similarly, at the federal level, the Public
Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program, established in 1998,
provides spouses and children of such rescuers tuition, room and board, books,
supplies, and education-related fees for up to forty-five months of full-time education
or training at any institution.213 Apparently PSOEA benefits are not reduced by similar
benefits provided at the state or local level.
2. Why the Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Problems of Disability Insurance
Do Not Lead to Undercompensating Professional Rescuers
Who Suffer a Disability Loss
Of the arguments against relying on first-party benefits in lieu of tort liability, the
most popular-and forceful-stems from the reduced incentive for precaution taking
by the potential tort defendants. But the next most popular stems from the supposed
inability of first-party disability benefits, as a matter of economic theory, to provide
adequate compensation, no matter how generous in fact those benefits appear to be.
214
This supposed inability arises from the adverse selection and moral hazard problems
that are said to guarantee that first-party disability benefits will be less than the amount
that would be called for by compensation purposes. The argument maintains that if
disability benefits increase to the amount that is appropriate for compensation
purposes, adverse selection among the young adults who might become professional
rescuers, and the moral hazard by actual professional rescuers, will so raise the cost of
the package of disability benefits that the package can no longer feasibly be offered.
209. For example, Minnesota's death benefit is $100,000. MINN. STAT. § 299A.44 (2006);
see also THE CITY PENSION FUND FOR FIREFIGHTERS AND POLICE OFFICERS IN THE CITY OF TAMPA
SUMMARY OF PLAN DESCRIPTION (2006), http://www.tampagov.net/dept f pension/
files/Plan%20Documents/spd%2010%2006.pdf.
210. For example, Fayetteville, North Carolina guarantees a minimum death benefit of
$25,000 after one year on the job or the decedent's salary for the preceding year, whichever is
more. Fayetteville Police Department, Salary/Benefits, http://police.ci.fayetteville.nc.us/
recsalarybenefits.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
211. Public Safety Officer Benefit Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2002).
212. E.g., 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 195 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 390.1242 (1996)),
described at http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,1607,7-123-1564-83066--,00.html.
213. U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET: PUBLIC SAFETY
OFFICERS' EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/bja/fs000270.pdf.
214. Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75
CORNELL L. REv. 313, 362 (1990) (arguing that adverse selection and moral hazard problems
generally prevent first-party disability benefits from achieving compensation goals).
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The adverse selection problem presupposes that persons who might consider
applying to become professional rescuers know something about themselves that the
public employer selecting them cannot learn in time, namely, their tendency to claim
disability. Their tendency to claim is a function of many factors, including how injury-
prone they are (both as to chance and severity of injury); how long they require to
recover from injury and to return to work; how likely they are to make a claim once
injured; how much they prefer subsidized unemployment to working; how likely they
are to fake or exaggerate claims or to malinger; and how likely they are to stand their
ground when suspected of faking, exaggerating, or malingering. Those who know they
have a high tendency to claim disability, the argument continues, will
disproportionately apply for this work and will constitute a disproportionate percentage
of the force should disability benefits increase to the point where they approach full
compensation. The problem is most obvious when a working person, instead of
obtaining group disability benefits through his work, buys an individual disability
insurance policy in the private market. One can expect that those workers who buy an
unusual amount of disability insurance will be disproportionately those with a tendency
to claim. These claim-prone individuals become high-risk insureds. When the high-risk
insureds disproportionately buy coverage, coverage becomes a poorer deal for the low-
risk insureds. If the low-risk insureds drop coverage as a result, the insurer will be left
covering only the high-risks who remain. Nor can the insurer survive by raising his
premiums to the level appropriate for the remaining high-risks, because as premiums
rise toward that level, the lower of the remaining risks drop out, threatening to unravel
his risk pool until no one is covered.2 15 One countermeasure said to be necessary to
hold down the amount of adverse selection is to keep disability benefits well below
working income. And in the individual market, disability plans offering more than 50-
60% of working income are rare.
There are a number of methods available to the public employers of rescuers to
minimize the concern that the claim-prone will adversely select this work.216 First, the
employers minimize adverse selection the same way private employers do-by
providing their first-party-benefit package automatically to all who are hired rather
than by offering that package, or any part of it, as an option. The individual rescuers
have no choice about buying these benefits. The only selection left to individual
rescuers who know they are claim-prone is whether to join the force in the first place,
and the tendency to make disability claims is presumably only one of many factors
influencing that selection. Second, employers, through their medical exams, fitness
tests, and character investigations of applicants, screen out some of the claim-prone.
Third, by linking job assignments and promotions, if only informally, with a rescuer's
record of disability claims, employers can render this work less attractive to the claim-
prone. Fourth, the employers, being public, may offer disability benefits more generous
215. Insurers have financial reasons to combat adverse selection, even when the possibility
of complete unraveling, sometimes called the "death spiral," does not exist.
216. Doubts have been raised about the significance of adverse selection. See generally Peter
Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J.
1223 (2004). For example, the claim-prone as a group may include more members who would
shy away from dangerous work compared to the group which is not claim-prone. Hence
generous disability benefits for dangerous work may attract as many applicants who are not
claim-prone as applicants who are.
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than private insurers could profitably offer in the marketplace. That is, the first-party
benefits offered by a public employer may more resemble government insurance than
private insurance, government insurance being a euphemism for government welfare.
COBRA temporary health insurance benefits for those who leave employment are an
example of government insurance. The government originally hoped to fund these
optional benefits through private insurance. But when private insurers deemed this
insurance unprofitable, perhaps because the benefits would be adversely selected for
primarily by those who anticipated above-average health expenses, the government
subsidized what could not be offered profitably.
Moral hazard in our context refers to the tendency, arising from disability
compensation, for professional rescuers, intentionally or unintentionally, to take the
risk of and to claim disability more than they would otherwise. 2 17 It includes relaxing
the care the rescuers would normally take for their safety as well as more blatant
examples like malingering. Just as patients who are covered by health insurance
providing 100% reimbursement consume a far higher volume of medical services than
do patients whose policies include a substantial cost-sharing provision,218 one can posit
that rescuers who receive disability compensation equal to their regular income will be
more claim-prone than rescuers who receive less.
Employers of rescuers may not be able to defend against moral hazard as readily
and completely as they defend against adverse selection. Still, the problem does not
justify skepticism about whether apparently adequate disability compensation is
adequate in fact. First, as we saw with adverse selection, an employer designing
disability benefits for its public employees need not necessarily put together a package
that a private disability insurer could offer profitably. Offering more generous
disability benefits than would be available to workers receiving the same salary in the
private sector may be a disguised salary raise and may be more convenient and
politically salient than a straightforward raise. 2t 9 Second, the employer may see some
benefit in encouraging professional rescuers, at certain obvious times, to resist their
natural inclination to protect themselves at the expense of endangered members of the
public or endangered property. Benefits that induce rescuers to behave at certain times
as if they were more indifferent to danger may actually serve the employer's purpose.
For this reason the employer may object less to the demand of the professional
rescuers' unions to increase disability compensation than to an equally costly demand
for higher salaries. Indeed the advent of collective bargaining and the unionization of
professional rescuers have increased fringe benefits like disability compensation four
times as much as they have increased salaries.
220
217. "Claiming disability" here does not require a formal claim. Simply taking sick leave
when one would otherwise come in to work would be an example.
218. Mitchell D. Wong et. al., Effects of Cost Sharing on Care Seeking and Health Status:
Results from the Medical Outcomes Study, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1889, 1892 (2001) (the larger
the co-payment for medical services, the less medical care is sought).
219. See supra text accompanying note 196.
220. Casey Ichniowski, Economic Effects of the Firefighters' Union, 33 INDuS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 198, 206 (1980). Among the reasons given for the greater impact of firemen's unions on
fringes than on salaries, and for the higher ratio of fringe benefits compared to salaries of
professional rescuers generally, are that the fringes do not take effect immediately. A bargaining
representative for the Yonkers firefighters "has found, for example, that bargaining with a lame-
duck administration, when there is going to be a change in party control, allows the union local
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Of course, only a small fraction of the professional rescuers' time on the job is
devoted to facing perils. During the bulk of the professional rescuers' time on the job,
employers will not want their professional rescuers to relax their care for themselves.
And after an injury, however caused, the employer will not want professional rescuers
to malinger. But at least two measures, other than lowering benefits, are available to
employers to counter this moral hazard behavior. First, as indicated before, employers
monitor claims for disability benefits, 22 ' and, at least informally, link the record of
disability claims to promotion and job assignment. Second, to varying extents,
employers use the same measure that proved successful with the workingmen's
cooperative accident insurance associations in the second half of the nineteenth
century: fostering solidarity among the members of the squad.222 The intimacy of
rescuers' face-to-face relationships with each other and their mutual dependence help
them to monitor one another's claims, and forging norms of brotherly spirit and manly
resistance to injuries further reduces the incidence of self-seeking claims.
In sum the argument that adverse selection and moral hazard necessarily prevent the
first-party-benefit providers of rescuers from arranging a benefit package that
adequately achieves societies' compensation goals relies on certain assumptions drawn
from the private market for individual disability insurance that need not apply in the
public sector. The argument also fails to appreciate some of the measures by which this
opportunistic behavior can be controlled. The argument is further undermined by
empirical evidence that the package of first-party benefits actually offered rescuers
comes close to assuring what every worker who faces a risk of injury may regard as the
ideal financial protection--constant income through one's working career regardless of
injury. There is little reason to assume that rescuers, through their representatives, fail
to buy the amount of compensation for their injuries that they want, subject to the usual
budget restraints affecting the compensation of all public employees.
CONCLUSION
The Victim Compensation Fund (VCF) 223 for those injured and for the survivors of
those killed on 9/11, thanks to largely displacing tort liability, 2 4 finished virtually all
to make significant gains in fringes." Id. He says the administration of one political party will
sometimes purposely agree to increase personnel costs in subsequent years in order to
exacerbate the budget difficulties of the rival party's incoming administration, while, at the same
time, winning for themselves the future support of the firemen's union. Id. at 606-07.
221. See Michael J. Karter, Jr. & Stephen G. Badger, United States Firefighter Injuries of
2000, 95 J. NAT'L FIRE PROTEcTION AGENCY 49-54 (2001).
222. See John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical
Tort Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 692, 781,
787 (2001) (pointing out that cooperative associations succeeded in offering sustained disability
benefits, whereas otherwise identical commercial insurance failed, and attributing the different
results to the cooperative associations' better control of adverse selection and moral hazard).
223. Eleven days after the 9/11 attacks, Congress enacted the "September 11 th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001," Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 237-241 (2001) (codified as
amended at 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.1 to .71 (2006)).
224. The VCF did not in any way pursue deterrence. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D.
Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: Collateral Sources Under the September lth Victim
Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 591, 596, 613 (2003).
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its work by the end of 2004.225 Consider how matters would likely stand today, more
than five years after 9/11, had the losses of the victims been handled in the usual way 226
through our tort system. The lawsuits by the victims for the causal negligence of the
many companies they could sue 227 would probably be grinding their way through the
court system, with final appeals and payment to the victims still an unknown number of
years away. Some of the older parents of those killed would have come to realize that
they would see their graves before they would see the lawsuits finally resolved.228
By now, in light of the visibility and interest in these suits and the public's
solicitude for the victims, the tort system, more than the behavior of the defendants,
would be on trial in the public mind. The public would have learned the savage
percentage of the defense payments likely to go to expenses and to the various
attorneys. 2 29 The causal negligence and solvency of the defendants being uncertain, at
225. Ninety-five percent of survivors who had the choice of pursuing a claim in tort or a
claim under the VCF opted into the VCF and out of the tort system. David W. Chen, Applicants
Rush to Meet Deadline for Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at Al. Of course they had
the added incentive that came from the decision by Congress to hold the total amount of each
defendant's tort liability to the limit of each defendant's liability insurance. See Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 201, 408(a), 115
Stat. 230, 234-36, 240-41 (2001) (codified as amended at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2006)). For many
survivors the choice was easy, even though it meant dispensing with their following rights under
tort law: (1) an individualized jury trial; (2) a jury determination of their economic,
noneconomic, and punitive damages; (3) their election of the timing and, to some extent, the
forum for their claims; (4) their chance to give their personal testimony at trial; and (5) their
right to vigorous adversarial representation in a litigation setting. See Roger Parloff,
Tortageddon, AM. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 106, 106; Stuart Taylor, Jr., How 9/11 Shines a Spotlight
on Litigation Lottery, 34 NAT'L J., Jan. 5, 2002, at 12-13. Arguably, the public reaction to 9/11
that was reflected in public support for the VCF was itself an indictment of the tort system.
226. By the "usual way," I mean in particular with the attorneys and experts charging their
usual fees. As is widely known, a more than ample number of attorneys offered to help the
victims of 9/11 process their claims with the VCF free of charge. See Warily Circling the Sept.
11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at A26 (noting efforts of the American Trial Lawyers
Association in providing volunteer attorneys to assist claimants in preparing claim application
forms and other papers.) It is entirely possible that, absent the VCF, attorneys and experts might
have been willing to pursue the victims' tort claims free of charge as well, perhaps partly in the
hope that the prominence of the cases would result in good advertising. Even so, there is no
reason to think the attorneys for the defense would have reduced their usual fees. Although the
administrative expenditures per dollar of benefit received by the victims have not yet been
published, it is clear that those expenditures were dramatically lower per dollar of benefit
received than they would have been under the tort system.
227. Potential defendants include the airline security companies, the airports, the airlines, the
aircraft manufacturers, the managers, owners and builders of the World Trade Center, and the
Pentagon and other government entities.
228. See generally Daniel W. Shuman, When Time Does Not Heal: Understanding the
Importance of Avoiding Unnecessary Delay in the Resolution of Tort Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 880 (2000) (examining the psychological harm both to plaintiffs and defendants of
unnecessary delay in the resolution of tort cases).
229. Despite thirty years of effort through class actions, consolidation, and multidistrict
panels to narrow the issues and streamline the litigation in the asbestos cases, 69% of all defense
payments in those cases still go for expenses and attorneys fees. See Deborah Hensler, The
Asbestos Cases After 30 Years, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 211, 247 (2004).
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least some victims would emerge from their years in the tort system empty handed-a
result widely denounced as cruel. The usual linedrawing of torts-whereby damage
awards for similarly situated plaintiffs differ dramatically 23 0-would seem arbitrary to
a public that overwhelmingly viewed the victims as members of a single community
who should receive roughly equal damages. 231 Imagine 2000 individualized evaluations
of the pre-death pain and suffering of each decedent and perhaps 5000 individualized
evaluations of the loss of companionship suffered by each wrongful death plaintiff. Is it
any wonder that the Fund's decision to measure these damages with a grid (at least
presumptively) was generally well received?
In light of the public's concern for the victim's vulnerability, the public would
likely recoil at the enormous stress the protracted litigation, especially the defendant's
brutal counter-discovery, was inflicting on the victims. Each publicized occasion in
which the victims were required to relive their anguish would further undermine the
legitimacy of the system. The usual jockeying of some victims' attorneys to sign up
more victims, and to gain priority for their victims over other victims in pursuing the
dwindling liability insurance of the defendants, would likely attract public scorn.
232
Even the defendants, however negligent the evidence unearthed through litigation may
show them to have been, would be increasingly viewed as more sinned against than
sinning, sinned against not only by the terrorists but by the tort process itself Given the
many precautionary measures against future terrorist attacks that the government will
mandate without the influence of tort liability, the public would likely find absurd the
notion that this tort liability will produce more appropriate precaution taking by these
defendants. 233 Perhaps the litigation would have vividly brought home to the public a
point many scholars have admitted but then ignored: that our tort system cannot be
justified on compensation or insurance grounds.
Plaintiffs who are premium planners for their injuries have created a less generous
version of their own VCF, albeit their first-party benefits suggest an ex ante model for
continuing injuries rather than an ex post response to a discrete event. When the type
230. There are many reasons to believe the damage awards in 9/11 cases, especially for pain
and suffering, would vary from jury to jury as much as they usually vary in tort litigation. See,
e.g., Neal R. Feigenson, Emotion, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 959 (2003) (discussing possible cognitive biases that might cause jurors to be sympathetic
either to claimants or potential defendants in litigation over 9/11 claims).
231. Most of the plaintiffs viewed themselves as members of a single community as well. See
Kellyanne Conway, The Microecomic Effects of the Terrorists Attacks on September 11:
Americans Helping Americans, 16 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 101, 113-16(2002)
(describing the many efforts of the injured and the survivors to group themselves with each
other after 9/11).
232. Because the VCF did not cover the claims for property damage, those claims would
have competed with claims of the victims and may have nearly exhausted the limits of the
defendants' liability insurance.
233. Even assuming these defendants were causally negligent (the unprecedented nature of
the terrorists' behavior and the past experience with airplane hijackings, almost all of which
ended safely, argue against any negligence), is there any reason to believe that a guarantee of
tort liability for such negligence would have led the defendants to take better precautions against
such hard-to-foresee behavior as that of the terrorists? As the 9/11 Commission found, the
essential problem was lack of overall security planning. Would a guarantee of tort liability have
addressed that problem?
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of injury these plaintiffs have anticipated occurs through the ordinary negligence of
another, courts should pause before assuming that imposing tort liability on the other
will serve society's interests. Courts should consider the marginal improvement in
safety that such liability, in the context before them, is likely to achieve, keeping in
mind the other incentives for safety operating on the defendants. When the safety gain
from liability appears modest, courts should consider whether the costs of imposing
liability for negligence outweigh the benefits. This Article has suggested-in the
context of the fireman's rule-some of the considerations that should lead courts to
conclude that the social calculus favors denying liability, a conclusion courts should
express by giving serious consideration to defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground
of"no duty" or "no proximate cause," or by invoking rules such as the fireman's rule.
As Professor Henderson has argued, the expansion and purification of the negligence
concept threatens the rule of law and carries consequences both unintended and
undesirable.234
234. See Henderson, Jr., supra note 1, at 491.
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